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I. INTRODUCTION
In January 2010, the U.S. Department of Justice published the
findings of a recent survey it conducted; the National Survey of Youth
in Custody (Survey) quantifies the scope of the daunting problem of
sexual abuse of power. The Survey defines sexual victimization as any
unwanted sexual activity between youth and all sexual activity between
youth and staff.2 The data indicates that 10.3% of youth (2730 victims)
in confinement facilities had been sexually victimized by facility staff.
Surprisingly, 6.4% of youth (1710 victims) reported neither any force,
threat of force, or other explicit forms of coercion, nor offers of favors,
protection, drugs, or alcohol in exchange for engaging in the sexual
activity.4
These findings, however, are merely the tip of the iceberg, as they
demonstrate only one facet of the overall phenomenon of sexual abuse
of power. People in various professional and institutional settings
endure many forms of unwanted sexual acts that are perpetrated against
them by people in positions of power. These perpetrators abuse their
1.

YOUTH,

ALLEN J. BECK ET AL., SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION IN JUVENILE FACILITIEs REPORTED BY

2008-09

(2010)

[hereinafter

SEXUAL

VICTIMIZATION],

http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?iid= 2113&ty-pbdetail. The survey, which was mandated by
the Prison Rape Elimination Act, reveals that an estimated 12% of youth (3220 victims) in state
operated and locally or privately operated juvenile facilities reported experiencing one or more
incidents of sexual victimization by another youth or by facility staff; 2.6% of youth (700
victims) reported an incident involving another youth; 10.3% (2730 victims) reported sexual
contact with facility staff; and approximately 95% of these victims reported that they had been
abused by female facility staff.
2. Id. at 4.
3. Id. at 8.
4. Id. at 9.
5.

See generally STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED

SEX: THE CULTURE

OF
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power, authority, trust, and influence to obtain sexual intercourse.6 In
this Article, I use the phrase "sexual abuse of power" to refer to the
different expressions of this phenomenon; these include various
coercive pressures stemming from professional and institutional
relationships that place victims in fear of non-physical harm
(professional, institutional or economic injuries) and result in sexual
submission.
Sexual abuses of power vary significantly in the degree of abuse and
coercion that they demonstrate. They include a wide range of sexual
misconducts. On one end of the coercion spectrum we find the first
category of cases, namely, public officials who explicitly threaten to
inflict harm, if their sexual demands are refused, on victims whose
personal liberty is legally confined, such as suspects and inmates. On
the other end we find a second category: owners of private businesses
who merely propose sexual relations to their employees, making neither
a threat nor mentioning any employment-related decision.8 Even though
these misconducts are on opposite ends of the spectrum, they share
some distinctive features: first, the perpetrator engages in unilateral
sexual conduct with another person by exploiting that other person's
body for the purposes of his own gratification, arousal or sexual
pleasure, and against the will of that other person, thus resulting in
substantial harm. Second, submission to unwanted sexual acts is not
obtained by consent, but rather, by intimidation and coercive pressures
stemming from the disparities in powers between the parties, which
induce mere acquiescence. 9
Yet, current laws fail to properly capture these features by offering
an overall doctrinal framework that would criminalize such abuses of
power. Despite many years of reform in laws pertaining to rape and
sexual assault, various forms of sexual abuse of Power continue to leave
many victims without redress or legal remedy. Furthermore, most of
these abuses remain outside the scope of criminal regulation." Current
laws offer only partial and insufficient remedies to the problem of
INTIMIDATION AND THE FAILURE OF LAW (1998).

6. Id.
7. See, e.g., State v. Felton, 339 So. 2d 797 (La. 1976) (upholding the convictions of a
police officer who forced a woman to have sexual intercourse with him by threatening to arrest
her).
8. See, e.g., State v. DiPetrillo, 922 A.2d 124 (R.I. 2007) (reversing the conviction of an
employer who coerced sex on his employee).
9. Samedi v. Miami-Dade County, 206 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 1215 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (two
county employees who coerced sex on a cleaning lady, telling her that they were her bosses and
that they would fire her if she did not submit to their demands).
10. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 1-16 (discussing various examples of sexual abuses
of power that remain outside the scope of criminal regulation).
11. Id.

80

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 21

sexual abuse of power. Criminal charges are sometimes brought against
the first category, public officials who have abused their power,
incorporating egregious and transparent examples of sexual abuse.' 2 An
abuse of power model, which acknowledges the effects of the disparities
in positions between the parties, is often employed to criminalize these
cases. 13 However, the cases in the latter category, including owners of
private businesses, who propose sexual relations without explicit
threats, are typically not criminalized.14 Criminal charges are rarely
brought in these seemingly ambiguous and less transparent cases of
sexual abuse of power.1 From a criminal law perspective, these cases
are to be found at the peripheries of law, as they lie outside the "hardcore" egregious sexual misconduct.
When many sexual abuses of power are not viewed as justifying
criminalization, civil laws come into play. Civil suits for damages and
professional codes of ethics are often employed whenever professional
and institutional relations are exploited to induce sexual submission. 1 In
the workplace and in an academic setting, sexual abuses of power are
typically treated in courts as merely one form of sexual harassment,
which may be appropriate for intervention under Title VII or Title IX of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 outlawing employment and education
discrimination because of sex.1 7
We must question, however, whether these civil remedies are a
sufficient response to the criminal wrongs perpetrated in sexual abuse of
power cases. Indeed, they are insufficient in coping with the specific
12. See, e.g., State v. Cummings, 1990 WL 40018 (Ohio App. 10 Dist., 1990) (upholding
the conviction of a police officer who coerced sex on a DUI suspect).
13. See generally WAYNE LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 17.3 (2d ed. 2009)
(discussing legislative reforms that criminalize sexual abuses of authority).
14. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 112 (suggesting that criminal law is not always the
best tool for regulation).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 206-26 (discussing various forms of civil regulations that might apply when
psychia-trists and psychologists abuse their professional power to induce their patients'
submission to sexual demands).
17. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin ...
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000). Title IX of this Act provides that "[n]o person in the United
States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance." 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000).
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harms that result from these abuses. Furthermore, they are far too weak
and cannot offer an inclusive legal tool that would help diminish this
phenomenon.
This Article evaluates whether current laws are taking into account
the experiences of victims of sexual abuse of power and the full extent
of harm they suffer. It contends that current laws do not do so. It further
argues that sexual abuse of power induced by fears and pressures,
stemming from professional and institutional relations, is wrongful
conduct that warrants its own definition and criminal sanctions above
and beyond those currently available. However, the current legal
frameworks have distracted both legislatures and scholars from dealing
with the harms inflicted by these abuses, thus obfuscating the need to
provide an adequate legal response to them.
Current views fail to acknowledge that because coerced sex in these
settings provide a poignant example of sexual abuse of power, it should
be criminalized like other forms of sexual abuse of power. It further
obfuscates the close similarities between sexual abuses of power in the
workplace and in an academic setting, and sexual offenses that typically
occur in comparable professional and institutional settings, such as in
cases where police officers coerce sex on unwilling suspects.
Legislatures and commentators alike have failed to consider the
application of one doctrinal framework that would allow criminalizing
these various forms of sexual abuse of power. An abuse of power model
has never been extended beyond the context of official abuse of
authority to encompass similar abuses in cases in which formal
authority to enforce obedience is lacking, such as in the workplace and
in an academic setting. Moreover, the current focus on the right to
sexual autonomy has distracted reformers and legislatures from
capturing two fundamental rights: the right to remain free from sexual
coercion and the right to enjoy sexual integrity.
This failure to properly address the harms of different forms of
coerced sex through the criminal law lens is why this Article focuses on
these sexual abuses of power so often overlooked by criminal law.
Indeed, although at the margins of criminal law, the significance of
these types of sexual abuses of power and the harms they inflict are
certainly not marginal. This Article's key goal is to take up the
challenge of separately addressing these subtler and less transparent
types of sexual abuse of power by providing an inclusive doctrinal
model that would enable their criminalization.
This Article's main thesis is that these different forms of sexual
abuse of power can and should be treated as criminal conduct, and, in
particular, as one subcategory of sexual offenses. The Article contends
that all sexual abuses of power inflict similar harms stemming from the
perpetrator's wrongful conduct, and therefore may justify
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criminalization. This Article further argues that sexual abuses of power
should not only be viewed as one form of unwanted sexual relationship,
as they are typically viewed today, but also as a prominent example of a
nonconsensualsexual relationship.
The Article proposes a comprehensive doctrinal model that would
also enable the criminalizing of cases that typically lie outside the
boundary of criminal sexual misconduct. By offering an overall legal
response to the problem of sexual abuse of power, the model draws
neither on threats to harm the victims, nor on the perpetrators' or the
victims' features, including the question of official abuse of authority.
In particular, the Article argues that this model may equally apply to
those categories of sexual abuses of power that traditionally have not
been viewed as amounting to criminal conduct, mainly in the workplace
and in an academic setting where the victims are competent adults.
The Article takes up this task by challenging the current definitions
of two key notions, authority and consent, and by proposing the
adoption of modified definitions for them. Under current criminal laws,
the construction of the notion of power is typically limited to
incorporate only the official authority to enforce and command
obedience. This Article argues that the definition of "authority," for the
purposes of the criminal prohibition, should be broadly construed to
enable criminalizing additional expressions of power that stem from
influence, dominance, and dependency. This definition would
acknowledge that power includes the capacity to influence and to
dominate the actions and decisions of vulnerable adult victims, by
subjugating their will to that of the powerful perpetrator and inducing
their submission to unwanted sexual demands.
Second, this Article makes the connection between sexual abuses of
power and the definition of consent in the context of sexual relations. In
particular, it contends that consent to sexual relations is not obtained
when it is induced by sexual abuse of power. Instead, pressures and
intimidation stemming from the abuse of power, authority, trust, and
dependence induce apparent consent. The Article suggests that current
views of consent have distracted our attention from asking the right
questions. A key question this Article attempts to grapple with therefore
is not whether technical permission or authorization of the sexual act
was given, but rather why. It explores the reasons for the decision to
give permission; only then can it be determined whether this permission
in fact qualifies as valid consent. The Article therefore proposes
adopting a modified definition for the notion of consent to sexual
relations, one that would capture the link common to all sexual abuses
of power: that consent to sex is not obtained when it is induced by fears
and pressures stemming from sexual abuse of power.
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The Article proceeds as follows: Part II demonstrates that sexual
abuses of power provide a prominent example of harmful sexual
conduct. It suggests that when Justice Kennedy refers in Lawrence v.
Texas' to people "who are situated in relations where consent might not
easily be refused," he is alluding to sexual abuses of power in
professional and institutional relationships. It further contends that the
current legal understanding of sexual abuses of power as consensual is
misguided, because it is based on a mistaken understanding of consent.
Part III examines the poignant problem of apparent consent to sexual
relations by defining it as "permission or authorization to engage in
sexual acts, either by the complainant's express words or by her
behavior, which is given for any reason other than the complainant's
positive willingness." It challenges the contemporary definition of
consent by arguing that, under current judicial decisions, this definition
is flawed. The decision in State v. Babyl9 best illustrates this problem by
focusing exclusively on the objective expressions of consent, and by
viewing consent as encompassing merely permission rather than a
mutual decision that indicates willingness. o In response to these
drawbacks, this part offers a modified definition of consent that
encompasses both the subjective perception of the complainant's
willingness as well as its objective manifestations.
Part IV exposes the links between sexual abuse of power and the
definition of consent. It reveals that consent is not obtained when it is
induced by sexual abuse of power, authority, influence, and
dependence, because permission to engage in sexual acts is affected by
fears and pressures and is merely apparent. To demonstrate this claim,
this part compares and contrasts abuses of power by public officials and
by private employers to show that these abuses share similar features
and thus justify criminalization.
Part V proposes the adoption of a comprehensive sexual abuse of
power model. It articulates the prohibition's two key components,
disparities in powers in professional and institutional relations and the
element of exploitation or abuse. Part V further articulates several
circumstances that illustrate this exploitation, emphasizing the
divergence from community standards of expected and acceptable
conduct, and the departure from professional norms. This part
demonstrates that expanding the definition of sexual coercion to include
18. See Lawrence v.- Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (holding that the case "does not
involve persons who might be injured or coerced," but rather "adults who, with full and mutual
consent from each other engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle").
19. See Baby v. State, 910 A.2d 477 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006), superceded by Baby v.
State, 916 A.2d 410 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007), vacated by State v. Baby, 946 A.2d 463 (Md.
2008).
20. Id.
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those pressures and fears stemming from professional and institutional
settings would allow criminalizing various forms of abuse of power,
above and beyond those that are currently acknowledged as criminal
conduct, including in the workplace and in academic settings.
II. SEXUAL ABUSE OF POWER AS HARMFUL CONDUCT

She does not resist. All she does is avert herself: avert her lips,
avert her eyes. She lets him lay her on the bed and undress her:
she even helps him . . . Not rape, not quite that, but undesired

nevertheless, undesired to the core. As though she had decided to
go slack, die within herself for the duration, like a rabbit when
the jaws of the fox close on its neck. So that everything done to
her might be done, as it were, far away.
J.M. Coetzee, Disgrace.21
A. Lawrence's Implications
Harm to others is the key justification for criminalizing sexual
abuses of power. While harm has always played a prominent role under
contemporary rape law, the landmark Lawrence v. Texas decision
explicitly endorsed this premise. 22 Recall Lawrence's language:
The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve
persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in
relationshipswhere consent might not easily be refused ... The
case does involve two adults who, with full and mutual consent
from each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a
homosexual lifestyle.
The Lawrence Court places substantive constitutional limits on the
extent to which criminal law can be used as a mechanism of regulating
21. J.M. COETZEE, DISGRACE 25 (1999) (portraying a university professor who coerces
sexual relations on his unwilling student. The protagonist's thoughts reveal his mens rea, which
is knowingly engaging in sex with a person who does not want the sexual acts). See also Anne
M. Coughlin, Interrogation Stories, 95 VA. L. REv. 1599, 1631-34 (2009) (discussing the
multiple potential stories about the sexual encounters between the professor and the student in
the novel, and the fact that there is no settled story, and suggesting that the second sexual
encounter between the professor and the student seems to be rape, not mere harassment).
22. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (holding that the case "does not involve persons who
might be injured or coerced," but rather "adults who, with full and mutual consent from each
other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle").
23. Id. (emphasis added).
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sexual conduct of consenting adults. 24 Writing for the Court, Justice
Kennedy outlines the framework for criminal regulation of sexuality by
identifying its outer boundaries. In outlining this framework, Justice
Kennedy makes clear that the conduct at issue in Lawrence falls outside
of the framework's outer boundaries.25 The Court holds that harm to
others is the core predicate for criminal regulation of sexual acts
between consenting adults in private settings. 6 Under this holding,
whenever harm to others is not established, the fundamental right to
sexual autonomy should prevail, and the idea of criminal regulation of
sexual conduct must be rejected.2 7
Over the seven years that have passed since the decision in
Lawrence, numerous scholars have suggested different understandings
of the Court's holding.28 While the Court's language itself suggests that
either broader or narrower interpretations of its holding are plausible,
under any reading of the case, consent and harm play a prominent role.
After Lawrence, criminal prohibitions apply only with nonconsensual
sexual relationships that inflict harm on others.
But does Lawrence have anything to do with sexual abuse of power?
This Article argues that it does, as it sheds a new light on potential, yet
unexplored, links between the underlying notions of harm, consent, and
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., Jeannie Suk, Criminal Law Comes Home, 116 YALE L.J. 2, 67 (2006)
(arguing that under Lawrence the right to autonomy at home flourishes at the expense of
criminal law regulation).
28. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Liberty After Lawrence, 65 OMo ST. L.J. 1059, 1061
(2004) [hereinafter Sunstein, Liberty After Lawrence]; see also Katherine M. Franke, The
Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1399, 1426 (2004) (arguing
that Lawrence offers an "uncharted territory that is worth exploring and possibly expanding . .
."); Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold: Of Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality and
Marriage,55 SUP. CT. REv. 27, 29-30 (2003) [hereinafter Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold]
(discussing various readings of the Lawrence decision). Under a broad reading, which draws on
principles of autonomy and liberty, the Lawrence Court grants a general right to engage in
consensual sexual behavior; this right is seen as a fundamental right for the purposes of due
process. It holds that the criminal prohibition on sodomy is unconstitutional because it intrudes
on private sexual conduct that does not harm third parties. Another reading focuses on the
rational basis of the offense. Under that reading the prohibition on sodomy is unconstitutional
because it is not supported by a legitimate state interest. The state cannot interfere with
consensual sexual behavior in which third parties are not harmed for only moral reasons.
However, more narrow, and perhaps less optimistic readings of the holding focus on protecting
the privacy aspect of a sexual relationship. Under this modest interpretation, Lawrence extends
privacy protections to consensual sexual activities. A criminal prohibition on sodomy is
unconstitutional because it intrudes on private sexual conduct without having a significant moral
basis in existing public commitments. In other words, in certain circumstances, the criminal law
cannot be enforced if it has lost public support. See Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold, supra,
at 29-30.
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sexual abuse of power. By linking people in relationships where consent
might not easily be refused with injured, coerced, and minor victims
the Lawrence Court implicitly alludes to sexual abuses of power.2
Furthermore, the Court mentions those whose consent might not easily
be refused in the same breath with injured, coerced, and minor victims,
suggesting that the former type of relationship offers one example of
harmful conduct, similar to the other forms of harmful sexual
misconduct it mentions. 30
The Lawrence decision directly addresses only the issue of
criminalizing a homosexual relationship between competent and
consenting adults.31 It therefore leaves unresolved many crucial
implications only briefly touched upon. One open question that is raised
in Lawrence but remains unresolved is: In what types of relationships
might consent not easily be refused? 32 Lawrence neither clarifies the
nature of these relationships, nor does it articulate the circumstances
under which they occur.
While Justice Kennedy does not elaborate on the types of
relationships in which consent might not easily be refused, a plausible
reading of the above passage suggests that sexual abuses of power are
precisely those types of relationships. 33 When submission to unwanted
sex is induced by sexual abuse of power, consent might not easily be
refused. Refusing it is too risky, because victims fear that rejecting the
perpetrator's demands would have harmful consequences. The features
that underline sexual abuses of power include the exploitation of the
stark imbalances in powers and positions between the parties that often
lead a victim to submit to unwanted sexual demands if only to avoid
potential harmful repercussions. Refusing consent under these
circumstances is too costly and is often an unrealistic course of action.
Rather, reluctant permission induced by pressures and fears seems to be
the only plausible option.
Distinguishing the Lawrence scenario from the other types of sexual
relationships mentioned by the Court attempts to set clear boundaries
between harmful and harmless sexual relationships. It further offers an
important insight into which types of relationships are harmful and
might justify criminalization. Justice Kennedy alludes to four separate
categories in which sexual relationships might be harmful: injured,
coerced, and minor victims; as well as people who are situated in
relationships where consent might not easily be refused.3 4 The court
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567, 578.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 560.
See id.
See id. at 578.
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does not further clarify, however, whether these four different
categories should be similarly treated. In particular, the Court does not
articulate whether all four categories might justify criminalization.
The Lawrence decision neither resolves the question of whether
sexual relationships in which consent might not easily be refused should
be treated as nonconsensual, nor whether consent that is given under
these circumstances is valid. Grouping injured, coerced, and minor
victims with people in relationships where consent might not easily be
refused, however, might imply two things. The first and narrower
reading is that the Court views all four categories as examples of
harmful conduct. If these relationships in which consent might not
easily be refused indeed allude to sexual abuses of power, the
underlying result would be that the Court views these abuses as one
example of harmful sexual misconduct.
The second broader, yet unexplored, reading suggests that the Court
not only views these abuses as examples of harmful conduct, but also as
potentially amounting to criminal conduct. While Lawrence itself does
not elaborate on this issue, the decision might be understood as raising
such a theoretical possibility, by excluding from the scope of its
constitutional protection cases in which consent might not easily be
refused. The Court suggests that these sexual relationships are indeed
harmful; this reading seems a straightforward application of the Court's
different categories, and invites us to contemplate whether this harmful
conduct may justify criminalization as well, similar to the previous
categories including coerced and minor victims. This Article suggests
that it does, by arguing that applying the harm principle, different forms
of sexual abuse of power justify criminalization.
An additional question that the Lawrence court did not elaborate on
is: what does an "abuse of an institution" mean? Justice Kennedy
explicitly excluded from the protection granted in Lawrence cases that
involve both "injury to a person" as well as "abuse of an institution the
law protects."3 5 But when is an institution itself being abused? Which
types of institutions does the Court allude to, and under which
circumstances does the abuse occur? Again, the Court leaves these
questions unresolved.3 6 One plausible reading of this exclusion may
suggest that abuses of institutions such as the workplace, an academic
setting, the healthcare profession, the legal profession, or law
enforcement agencies may meet this definition. Indeed, when
perpetrators who represent these institutions induce victims' unwanted
submission through abuse of their power, the institution itself is abused.
35. See id. at 567 (suggesting that the state could not intrude on sexual liberty "absent
injury to a person or abuse of an institution the law protects").
36. See id.
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Such abuse may damage the institution's reputation by compromising
its integrity and the public's trust in it.37 This reading of "abuse of an
institution" in Lawrence thus further explains why these abuses of
power are harmful conduct that potentially justifies criminalization.
Again, we are left to wonder whether cases in which perpetrators abuse
the institution they represent, and in particular, those that take place in
the workplace or in an academic setting may qualify as examples of the
abuses of institutions that the Court refers to. Yet neither Lawrence nor
subsequent Supreme Court decisions have addressed these questions,
leaving courts, as well as legal scholars, to keep struggling with their
far-reaching implications.
B. The Harms ofSexual Abuse ofPower
38
Unwanted sexual acts are harmful and painful to their victims.
Substantial similarities can be seen between the specific harms inflicted
on victims whose submission is induced by abuse of power, and the
harms inflicted in other sexual assaults. These common features
illustrate that the harms sustained by all victims of unwanted and
nonconsensual sex are in fact comparable, and therefore, when
combined with the perpetrator's wrongful conduct, support the
justifications for criminalizing these cases.
One preliminary clarification is necessary here: It may seem that this
Article mistakenly confuses nonconsensual sex with unwanted sex. It
does not. While at this stage the use of both terms interchangeably
might be somewhat confusing, the choice of both terms here is anything
but random. For now, the links between these two concepts remain
ambiguous. They will be clarified, however, as the Article unfolds.
Discussions of the common harms that various forms of abuse of
power inflict focus on identifying the victims' injuries and sufferings,
which are perceived in terms of invading and violating the rights to
which victims are entitled. Under this view, it is the violation of the

37. But cf S. Wesely Gorman, Comment: Sex Outside of the Therapy Hour: Practical
and ConstitutionalLimits on Therapist Sexual Misconduct Regulations, 56 UCLA L. REv. 983,
1026 (2009) (suggesting that some may argue that this is too broad a reading of this limitation).
I am aware, of course, that my reading is not the typical interpretation of the Court's language.
Under the more common view, Justice Kennedy is referring to the institutions of marriage and
the family in order to address Justice Scalia's criticism. Id. Again, Lawrence itself did not
elaborate what is meant by an abuse of an institution. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567. This leaves the
interpretation I suggest here a plausible one.
38. See, e.g., ROBIN L. WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE 100-78 (N.Y. Univ. Press 1997)
(1954) [hereinafter WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE] (discussing the types of harms stemming from
unwanted or unwelcome sex).
39. See generally ALAN WERTHEIMER, CONSENT TO SEXUAL RELATIONS 89-118 (2003)
(discussing the harms sustained by victims of unwanted sex in general, and rape victims in
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victims' fundamental rights that is at the core of the wrongness of both
rape and sexual abuse of power. 40 Sexual abuse of power, like rape,
constitutes serious harms to victims precisely because it typically
violates these rights. The right to remain free from sexual coercion
stands at the basis of these violations. Sexual coercion occurs whenever
a person engages in unilateral sexual acts with another person, by
exploiting that other person's body for the purposes of his own
gratification, arousal or sexual pleasure, against the will of that other
person. 4 1 Criminalizing sexual abuse of power is thus justified because
there is a paramount community interest to promote this fundamental
right.
The main types of harm inflicted in sexual abuses of power, which I
have elaborated more fully elsewhere, 42 may be summarized as follows:
first, violation of the right to remain free of sexual coercion; second,
violation of bodily integrity; third, privacy violations as well as
violation of sexual integrity, namely, harms of non-physical
invasiveness, such as personal violation of self, invasion of the psyche,
psychological impairment and distress, and invasion of privacy; and
fourth, violation of human dignity. This Article will not reiterate these
harms, because the injuries flowing from various forms of abuse of
power in professional and institutional relations are largely undisputed,
as many scholars agree that the fears and coercive pressures that often
characterize these relations are indeed harmful to victims. 43 Rather, it
will pursue a more controversial, yet not fully explored claim: sexual
abuses of power are not only harmful but also nonconsensual sexual
acts.
Harm does not suffice to criminalize sexual abuses of power; recall
that the core predicate for criminalization under Lawrence is
particular). See also Robin L. West, Legitimating the Illegitimate: A Comment on Beyond Rape,
93 COLUM. L. REV. 1442, 1448 (1993) [hereinafter West, Legitimating the Illegitimate] (arguing
that "from the victim's perspective, unwanted sexual penetration involves unwanted force," and
unwanted force is violent, and often leaves scars).
40. WERTHEIMER, supra note 39, at 108-09 (comparing and contrasting an experiential
and an essentialist account of the harm). While Wertheimer favors the experiential account of
the harm, the analysis I offer here is an essentialist account.
41. See generally Martha C. Nussbaum, Objectification, 24 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 249 (1995)
(articulating the wrong in abusing victims' bodies to fulfill personal urges. Nussbaum points out
to the wrong in objectification of women's bodies, namely the conversion of subjects into
instruments or tools. She focuses on notions of instrumentality and denial of autonomy and
subjectivity).
42. See generally Michal Buchhandler-Raphael, CriminalizingCoerced Submission in the
Workplace and in the Academy, 19 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 409, 422-27 (2010).
43. See, e.g., Robin L. West, DesperatelySeeking a Moralist,29 HARv. J.L. & GENDER 1,
19-20 (2006) [hereinafter West, DesperatelySeeking a Moralist] (arguing that unwanted sexual
acts, including those stemming from severe power imbalances, inflict serious harm on victims
but are nonetheless consensual).
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establishing nonconsensual sexual relations." It is the lack of consent
element that establishes the perpetrator's wrongful conduct, thus
justifying criminalization. Many scholars agree that coercive pressures
stemming from professional and institutional relations result in substantial
harm and injuries to victims. 45 However, most reject the idea of
criminalizing these abuses, viewing them as consensual, albeit unwanted,
sexual relations.

Most

scholars therefore treat nonconsensual and

unwanted sexual relations as different concepts in the context of criminal

law. 47

Robin West, for example, adopts this view. 4 8 Exploring the concept
of "unwanted sex," West suggests that:
Sometimes unwanted sex is non-consensual, and when it is, it is
rape. Sometimes, however, unwanted (or unwelcome or
undesired) sex is "consensual" in all the ways that matter to law,
and when such, it is not rape, and, entirely properly, not the target
of criminal rape law. However, even consensual sex that is
unwanted-meaning, unwanted sex that is not rape-might
nevertheless be harmful, injurious and the product of not-so
49
subtle background conditions of necessity and coercion. ...
This Article argues a different position; exploring the current
construction of the notion of consent to sexual relations, a task I take up
in the next part of this Article. Before doing so, and to better capture
what is missing in the current legal framework, here is a brief summary
of the current legal treatment of sexual abuses of power.
C. CurrentLegal Framework
The common understanding that most sexual abuses of power
demonstrate harmful, albeit consensual, sexual acts reflects the
prevalent view among most courts and legal scholars. 50 Many
44. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (holding that this case "does not
involve people who are injured or coerced").
45.

See, e.g., WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE, supra note 38, at 100-27. See also West,

DesperatelySeeking a Moralist, supranote 43, at 19-2 1.
46. West, DesperatelySeeking a Moralist,supra note 43, at 19.
47. Cf Meritor Say. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986) (holding that for the
purposes of sexual harassment, unwanted sex rather than nonconsensual sex should be the
controlling legal standard). See generally SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 280-81 (distinguishing
between unwanted and nonconsensual sex for purposes of criminalization).
48. See West, Desperately Seeking a Moralist,supra note 43, at 19-21 (discussing the
controversial distinction between nonconsensual and unwanted sexual relations).
49. Id. at 19.
50. See, e.g., SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 280-81 (arguing that the likelihood and the

2010]

SEXUAL ABUSE OF POWER

91

jurisdictions, however, partially acknowledge the effects of coercive
pressures that stem from professional and institutional settings by
criminalizing at least some forms of abuse that take place under these
settings.si The core predicate for criminalizing these cases rests on
demonstrating that the perpetrator has abused his powerful position to
coerce the victim's unwanted submission.52 But these laws are
significantly limited in criminalizing sexual abuses of power stemming
from institutional and professional relations; criminalization relies
heavily on the personal features of either the perpetrator or the victim. 53
Two main features characterize this type of legislation. One is
perpetrator-oriented: the official authority to exercise power; the other is
victim-oriented, and is two-folded: the victim's legal rights as well as
her alternative choices. 54
Many jurisdictions acknowledge that the perpetrator's abuse of his
official position of authority to enforce obedience demonstrates sexual
abuse of power that justifies criminalization.5 5 This feature is most
common in situations in which the peretrator has custodial control over
a victim, who is legally confined. These jurisdictions criminalize
abuses of power whenever the perpetrators are officially authorized to
exercise power over the victims.

degree of harm is much harder to justify in relations between parties of unequal power, and thus
criminal sanctions are out of place in most consensual sexual relations between supervisors and
subordinates or between teachers and students).
51. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.03(A)(6) (West 2008) ([t]he other person is
in custody of law or a patient in a hospital or other institution, and the offender has supervisory
disciplinary authority over such other person"). See also COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-402
(2004) (criminalizing guard-inmate sexual relations when it can be proved that the officer
coerced the victim to submit).
52. See generally Wayne LaFave, 2 Sust. Crim. L. § 17.3 subsection (d) Coercion: "Some
states have criminalized sexual intercourse between victims and persons holding positions of
trust or authority, as by making it a crime to use that position to cause submission, altering or
removing the consent requirement with regard to certain relationships (e.g., psychotherapistpatient) or by prohibiting sexual extortion in employment."
53. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 261 (West 2010); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-71
(West 2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011 (West 2010); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520B
(West 2010); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.343 (West 2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.03 (West
2010).
54. See supra note 53.
55. See LAFAVE, supra note 13, at 631-35 (discussing criminal prohibitions that adopt the
sexual abuse of power model).
56. Id.
57. See generally 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/11-9.2 (2001) (jurisdictions that adopt
provisions which criminalize certain forms of abuse of power stemming from institutional
settings); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520b (West 2008); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.344(1)(e)
(2007); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.03 (West 2008).
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In these cases, the perpetrators have the official power to command
the victims' obedience due to the victim's confinement.58 These
perpetrators are authorized by the government, the state, the city, or
another public institution to perform a professional role, and exceed the
scope of this authority by engaging in private conduct of a sexual
nature. 59 The inability of the victims, given their confinement, to
exercise free choices makes the sexual abuse of power in these cases
particularly egregious.6 0 The more transparent examples of sexual abuse
occur where police officers, prison guards, and military commanders
exploit their formal authority to enforce obedience over people who are
legally subjugated to their control by coercing them into unwanted
sexual demands.6 ' Under current laws, the main focus of the coercion
inquiry rests on whether the perpetrator's conduct violated any of the
complainant's legal rights by threatening to harm her, or instead offers
her some beneficial professional or institutional action in exchange for
sexual relations.62 Most jurisdictions are willing to acknowledge only
the former cases as coercive conduct, refusing to concede that beneficial
offers stemming from professional and institutional relations could be
equally coercive. 63
Previous proposals for rape law reform have generally not
acknowledged the central feature that is common to many situations
involving coercion: abuse of power, authority, trust, or dependence to
58. See, e.g., State v. Burke, 522 A.2d 725, 728 (R.I. 1987) (a uniformed police officer
who coerced sex on a drunken woman who he had picked up in his police cruiser while she was
hitchhiking).
59. See, e.g., State v. Motiff, 104 Or. App. 340, 801 P.2d 855 (Or. App. 1990) (a police
officer who was convicted of official misconduct after ordering an intoxicated victim to perform
oral sex on him. The court rejected the defendant's argument that a purely personal benefit, in
this case, sexual gratification, for a public official does not satisfy the elements of the offense of
official misconduct).
60. Id.
61. See, e.g., State v. Felton, 339 So. 2d 797, 799, 801 (La. 1976) (affirming the extortion
conviction of a police officer, who forced a woman to have sexual intercourse with him by
threatening to arrest her). See also State v. Robertson, 649 P. 2d. 569, 571 (Or. 1982)
(discussing the case of defendants who were accused of coercing the victim into sexual conduct
by threatening to expose a secret and publicize an asserted fact which would tend to subject her
to hatred, contempt, and ridicule).
62.

See generally ALAN WERTHEIMER, CONSENT TO SEXUAL RELATIONs 171-72 (2003)

(positing that where threats are absent, and proposals are made to engage in sex in exchange for
beneficial rather than detrimental employment decisions the criminal prohibitions do not apply,
since typically "offers" are not coercive).
63. See generally SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 166 (acknowledging that coercive
pressures do not end with threats and include two additional sets of circumstances. First, that
proposals cast as "offers" to provide benefits but may just as well be coercive; second, where
offers to engage in sexual acts are proposed. However, under the second set of circumstances, a
causal link between employment decisions and sexual submission is absent).
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induce sexual submission.6 Instead, they have focused on threats to
harm as the main feature justifying criminalization, refusing to concede
that coercive pressures that fall short of threats also amount to criminal
conduct. For example, previous proposals have not considered the
following as criminal: beneficial "offers" in exchange for sexual acts or
mere proposals to engage in sexual relations under Rrofessional and
institutional imbalances in powers between the parties. For instance, a
police officer waiving a DUI violation in exchange for sexual acts
would not be criminally liable. 6 6
The context of police misconduct provides a salient example in
which sexual abuses of power typically occur. 67 Abuse of power takes
64. Id.
64. Id. at 112 (contending that "criminal law is not always the best tool of regulation,
however, civil liability standards and private workplace norms are often better means of
protecting sexual autonomy, especially in the absence of illegitimate threats").
65. Id.
66. Id. at 150 (explaining that under current laws such circumstances amount to bribery,
but not to coercion).
67. Sexual abuses of power by police officers are often treated under federal law as a
constitutional violation. Federal law acknowledges the abuse of power by public officials as a
criminal offense. However, criminalizing sexual abuse of power by public officials is
accomplished indirectly, through the use of a constitutionally-based provision. There is no
specific federal statute that criminalizes sexual abuse of power by public officials. Rather,
broadly written civil rights provisions make it a crime to deprive a person of her civil rights
under the Constitution or laws of the United States. 18 U.S.C. section 242 employs broad
language to protect people against the violation of federal rights under color of law. This section
provides as follows:
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom,
willfully subjects any person .. . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United
States, or to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of .. . being
an alien, or by reason of his color, or race,

..

. shall be fined . . . or imprisoned

... and if bodily injury results ... imprisoned not more than ten years, or both,
and if death results ... any term of years or for life ....
18 U.S.C. § 242 (1996). Many criminal civil rights prosecutions are brought under this
provision against government officials for sexual assaults of victims under color of law. See,
e.g., United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 117 S. Ct. 1219 (1997) (criminal charges were
brought against a judge who sexually assaulted court employees and litigants who appeared
before him). These prosecutions include mainly three types of perpetrations: sexual assaults by
judges, sexual assaults by police officers, and sexual assaults by border patrol and correctional
officers. Mary-Christine Sungaila, Litigating Women's Rights as Human Rights: The Case of
United States v. Lanier, 7 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STuD. 329, app. (providing a list of cases
in which criminal charges were brought against public officials for sexual assaults). However,
this provision does not apply in cases in which the officer provided the suspect with some
benefit, to which she was not otherwise legally entitled. Under the common distinction between
threats to harm and offers to benefit, these beneficiary gains are not criminalized. For criminal
prosecutions of police officers under section 242, see, e.g., United States v. Contreras, 950 F.2d
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place in one of its most egregious forms takes place when a police
officer stops a suspect for an offense, and induces the victim's sexual
submission by threatening arrest if the demands are refused.6 8 Many
jurisdictions have recognized these sexual abuses as criminal conduct,
and have amended their laws to prohibit this abuse of power. 69 In these
cases, the coercive features of the perpetrators' conduct are hard to
dispute; a police officer who forces a suspect to choose between
submitting to sexual demands and some harmful consequence clearly
abuses his authority.
Many jurisdictions acknowledge that the misuse of official authority
in the prison context justifies criminalization.7 0 Inmates who are legally
confined and are subject to the formal authority of prison guards are
easy prey to sexual abuse of power. Their alternative courses of action
are significantly limited since they are in custodial control, and their
liberty is constrained.
However, most jurisdictions refuse to adopt similar criminal
provisions to include other forms of coercive pressures stemming from
professional and institutional settings when the official abuse of
authority element is lacking.71 Criminalization is typically not
considered whenever the victims are competent adults who are not
legally confined, and the perpetrators are not authorized to exercise
power by any official public institution. An example of this situation is
one where the perpetrators are private employers and business owners.
Under current laws, as well as under reformers' proposals, many
forms of sexual abuse of power remain outside the scope of potential
criminal regulation because they are viewed as consensual, albeit often
unwanted, sexual relationships. 72 These relationships include mainly
232, 234-35 (5th Cir. 1991) (affirming the conviction of a Laredo police officer who raped a
Mexican woman while he was on duty, and conspired to murder her when she was about to
testify against him); United States v. Davila, 704 F.2d 749, 750-51 (5th Cir. 1983) (affirming
convictions of border patrol officers who abused their positions of authority to coerce sex from
illegal aliens); United States v. Sanchez, 74 F.3d 562, 563 (5th Cir. 1996) (reversing the
conviction of a Galveston police officer who was convicted of coercing five women into
engaging in sexual acts with him while on duty); United States v. Volpe 224 F. 3d 72, 74 (2d
Cir. 2000) (affirming the conviction of a police officer who forced a broken broomstick into a
suspect's rectum).
68. See, e.g., State v. Cummings, No. 89AF-866, 1990 WL 40018, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App.
Apr. 5, 1990).
69. See, e.g., State v. Burke 522 A.2d 725, 728 (R.I. 1987) (affirming the conviction of a
police officer who abused his power to coerce sexual acts on a hitchhiker).
70. See, e.g., CoLo. REv. STAT. § 18-3-402(l)(f) (2004) (criminalizing guard-inmate
sexual relations when it can be proved that the officer coerced the victim to submit to such
relations). See also SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION, supra note 1.
71. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 112, 132-34 (limiting criminalization in these
settings to situations in which threats to harm are established).
72. See, e.g., Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
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coerced sex in the workplace and in an academic setting, where the
victims are affected by economic, professional, and institutional
inducements. In these settings, permission is viewed as valid consent as
the victims are competent adults." These views leave unpunished a
range of sexual transactions that might result in unwanted sexual
relations, because sex is given in exchange for some benefits desirable
to victims, including economic advantages in the workplace. Thus,
many sexual practices, which are essentially nonconsensual, are
characterized as legally permissible "sexual bargains."7 4 While
reformers propose to relax the criteria for what conduct constitutes a
sexual offense, most of them agree that submission resulting from
economic coercion in the workplace should not constitute a sexual
offense.7 5 Both courts and reformers thus refuse to recognize as criminal
conduct compulsion of an economic nature. 76

III. THE PROBLEM OF APPARENT

CONSENT

Lawrence made clear that only nonconsensual sexual acts might justify
criminal regulation. This view is premised on a preliminary assumption
that the term "nonconsensual" is clear and unambiguous. It further
73. See, e.g., Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1162 (9th Cir. 2003) (a 47year-old woman who decided to submit to the sexual demands of the professor for whom she
worked in order to keep her job).
74. See, e.g., West, Legitimating the Illegitimate, supra note 39, at 1443, 1448. West
correctly criticizes this model on two levels. First, she argues that viewing non-consensual
sexual relations as an expropriation wildly misdescribes the subjective experience of the victim
involved. Id. at 1448. More importantly, West contends, this model would leave untouched two
important classes of questionable sexual transactions. Id. at 1442. These include sexual
transactions in which the exchange of goods for sexual acts is secured through a legitimate
bargaining process born of necessity rather than choice. The first category that would be left not
criminalized includes sexual transactions, which result from fraudulent misrepresentation. But
more importantly, this proposal leaves not criminalized a range of sexual transactions that might
result in unwanted, undesired, and unpleasurable sex for women, but that are a part of what
"complex relationships" in which sex is given in exchange for some bundle of goods
presumably desirable by women, such as fidelity, economic security, or friendship. West
critiques Dripps's proposal as defending from criminalization many problematic social practices
as "sexual bargains" that women engage in, which are in his view, totally permissible both
legally and morally. Id. at 1452-59.
75. See generally Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual
Conduct, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 777, 820-25 (1988) (discussing the refusal of contemporary
jurisdictions to outlaw submission that is affected by economic coercion).
76. See generally WERTHEMER, supra note 39, at 189-92 (discussing the effects of
economic pressure and conditions of inequality on the question of consent to sexual relations.
He argues that it is a mistake to think that difficult circumstances and inequalities in positions
due to economic constraints should be regarded as justifications for invalidating the legal power
of consent).
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assumes that legislatures, courts, and scholars unanimously agree upon the
precise definition of consent. Yet, in practice, this is far from accurate:
consent to sexual relations is a highly controversial issue. The concept of
consent, persistently ambiguous, calls for a contextual interpretation.
What is "consent"? Legislatures, courts, and scholars are unable to
come up with one definition for the term. As some scholars note,
statutes and case law sometimes imply one meaning rather than the
other. 77 They further point out that "sometimes the usage in statutes and
cases is unclear or internally inconsistent."7 8 Scholars and judicial
decisions alike fail to articulate whether consent embodies an objective
act or rather a subjective state of mind. Instead, they have focused
their attention on developing the legal standard to determine when
consent to sexual relations is obtained. But looking into the question of
how consent is expressed, without having first resolved the preliminary
question of what consent means, misses the mark. The result is that the
current understanding of consent to sexual relations is flawed and
misguided. One of the fundamental problems in rape laws today stems
from failing to incorporate some crucial elements in the definition of
consent. The two missing elements are an envisioning consent as a
subjective state of mind, as one of willingness and mutuality.
A. The JudicialDiscourse on Consent to Sex
Evaluating the judicial discourse on consent to sexual relations is a
crucial component in understanding the drawbacks to the current views
77.

See STANFORD

KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND

ITS PROCESS, CASES AND

MATERIALS 331 (8th ed. 2007) (citing PETER WESTEN, THE LOGIC OF CONSENT: THE DIVERSITY
AND DECEPTIVENESS OF CONSENT AS A DEFENSE TO CRIMINAL CONDUCT (2004) (contending that

while we all employ claims of consent in everyday language and courts commonly predicate
legal rights and responsibilities on findings of consent or its absence, we do not share, either
individually or institutionally, a common concept of consent. He further claims that a number of
the competing concepts of consent that are regularly employed are either in themselves
conceptually incoherent or are frequently combined in ways that produce conceptual confusion.
Westen also argues that our failure to sort out our conceptual confusions results in gross
injustice as we punish the innocent and acquit the guilty.); see generally Heidi Hurd, Was the
Frog Prince Sexually Molested, 103 MICH. L. REv. 1329, 1329 (2005) (positing that Westen
proves that (1) we do not share, either individually or institutionally, a common concept of
consent, (2) a number of the competing conceptions of consent that are regularly employed are
either, in themselves, conceptually incoherent, or are frequently combined in ways that produce
conceptual confusion, and (3) our failure to sort out our conceptual confusions results in gross
injustices and inequalities as we punish the innocent and acquit the guilty).
78. Id.
79.

See, e.g., SANFORD KADISH ET AL, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 331 (8th ed.

2007) (suggesting that it is unclear whether consent is a state of mind: something that a person
feels, like willingness, or whether it is an action: something a person does, like giving
authorization).
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regarding this issue. We ask a fundamental question: What accounts for
the flawed understanding of what consent means? Answering this
question would not only clarify what is lacking in the current definition
of consent but would also facilitate incorporating these missing
elements in an alternative and improved definition.
1. Against a Person's Will or Without Consent?
The Court in State v. Rusk held that: "[I]t is well settled that the
terms 'against the will' and 'without consent' are synonymous in the
law of rape."80 Under common law, rape is defined as "the carnal
knowledge of a woman forcibly and against her will."' Many modem
rape laws have abandoned the obsolete phrase "against her will" and
replaced it with the neo-liberal phrase "without consent."82 What
assumption that underlies this change is that the phrases capture
identical meanings. The Maryland prohibition against rape, under which
Rusk was convicted, used both phrases "against the will" and "without
consent" in its definition. 83 The Rusk Court, like many other courts, held
that the phrases are synonymous. 84
While this premise has never been thoroughly challenged, it is
questionable whether it is truly accurate, and whether these phrases
secure precisely the same meaning. We must ask whether the current
view of consent is able to effectively capture the complainant's genuine
will, namely, whether she truly wants the sexual acts to take place.
Evaluating court decisions illustrates that the answer to these questions
is no. The contemporary shift from focusing on the complainant's will
to focusing on her consent results in missing a crucial component on
what consent to sexual relations must incorporate.
This Article suggests that under the current views on consent, the
phrases "against the will" and "without consent" are not synonymous.
There is a significant difference between these phrases as they capture
separate aspects in the definition of consent, and may therefore result in
different understandings of what genuine consent is. The phrase
80.

See State v. Rusk, 424 A.2d 720, 725 (Md. 1981).

81. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *210.
82. See MD. CODE CRIM. LAW § 3-303 (2009). See also ALA. CODE § 13A-6-61 (1977);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-402 (2004); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011 (2002); HAW. REV. STAT. §

707-731 (2009); MIss. CODE ANN.

§ 97-3-95 (1998); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.366 (2007); VT.

STAT. tit. 13, § 3252 (2005).
83. See MD. ANN. CODE CRIM. LAW

§

462 (2002) (prohibiting engaging in vaginal

intercourse by force or threat of force against the will and without the consent of the other
person), repealedby MD. CODE CRIM. LAW

§

3-303 (2009).

84. See Rusk, 474 A.2d at 725.
85. See, e.g., State v. Baby, 946 A.2d 463 (Md. 2008) (disregarding the issue of the
complainant's willingness).
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"against the will" connotes a subjective state of mind, such as not
wanting to and unwilling to engage in the sexual acts. Using the
"willingness" language as an element of the rape offense encompasses
the complainant's subjective experience and perception regarding
whether she wanted to engage the specific sexual act. In contrast, the
legal phrase "consent to sex" has re eatedly been characterized as
embodying an objective component.C This definition of consent
suggests that an actual act is required.
This alternative reading suggests that the two phrases must be
separate elements that define rape. The phrase "without consent" cannot
simply replace the phrase "against her will." In its place, an additional
element is required to similarly capture the victim's willingness to
engage in a sexual act. Accepting the premise that these phrases are
synonymous therefore has far-reaching implications. In the shift from
the previous language, something is lost on the way. The judicial focus
on the objective manifestations of consent has distracted us from
considering the additional and much-needed aspect of consent, which is
the subjective state of mind of the complainant's willingness. These
current views mask the question whether the victim actually wanted the
sexual acts to take place. The judicial reluctance to take into account the
complainant's will results from the false premise that the phrases
"without consent" and "against the will" are synonymous.
The judicial focus on the objective manifestations of consent is
understandable, because a perpetrator cannot be guilty if the victim has
failed to effectively communicate to him her unwillingness.8 7 However,
the fact that a person cannot be convicted, unless the evidence clearly
demonstrates that the complainant manifested her subjective state of
mind and her unwillingness to engage in sex, does not resolve the
fundamental question of what consent means. Conceptually, consent
must embody the complainant's subjective willingness; sexual acts are
either wanted or not, and willingness to engage in sex with the
perpetrator is either present or absent. There is no middle ground.
Evaluating whether these were effectively expressed to the perpetrator
is a different question that must be separately considered. The current
construction of consent, therefore, misses the mark, by neglecting to
address this subjective experience, and apply it accordingly. The failure
to take into account the complainant's unwillingness is therefore one of
86. See, e.g., State v. Koperski, 578 N.W. 2d 837, 844, 846-47 (1998) (emphasizing the
objective element of consent).
87. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 554 A.2d 713, 717 (Conn. 1989) (holding that although the
actual state of mind of the actor in a criminal case may in many instances be the issue upon
which culpability depends, a defendant is not chargeable with knowledge of the internal
workings of the minds of others except to the extent that he should reasonably have gained such
knowledge from his observations of their conduct).
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the reasons for the flawed judicial understanding of consent.
The above analysis demonstrates that surprisingly, the seemingly
anachronistic common law phrase "against the will" does a better job at
capturing the additional component of subjective willingness compared
with the more contemporary term "consent." Traditional common law,
by requiring that the evidence establish both subjective unwillingness
and actions refusing consent (physical resistance), achieved something
that contemporary rape laws have failed to do. Rape laws today have
practically abandoned the subjective aspect of consent, as the following
court decisions demonstrate.
2. Consent as Permission and Its Implications
While courts and legislatures have failed to articulate whether
consent is an objective act or a subjective state of mind, rape law reform
has primarily focused on searching for an objective legal standard to
determine when consent to sexual relations is established.
Acknowledging the shortcomings of the resistance standard, some
jurisdictions have adopted the "affirmative permission" standard. In the
landmark decision of In re Interest of M T.S., the New Jersey Supreme
Court embraced this standard for determining consent. The M T.S.
court held that the force or coercion requirement is met by establishing
that the perpetrator did not obtain the complainant's affirmative
permission to engage in sex with him. 90 The Court incorporated consent
into the definition of physical force, by defining it as any amount of
force in the absence of what a reasonable person would believe to be an

88. See generally KADISH ET AL., supra note 79 (explaining that common law required
both subjective as well as objective indications of consent).
89. In re Interest of M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266 (N.J. 1992).
90. See id. at 1276.
The understanding of sexual assault as a criminal battery, albeit one with
especially serious consequences, follows necessarily from the Legislature's
decision to eliminate non-consent and resistance from the substantive definition
of the offense. Under the new law, the victim no longer is required to resist and
therefore need not have said or done anything in order for the sexual
penetration to be unlawful. The alleged victim is not put on trial, and his or her
responsive or defensive behavior is rendered immaterial. We are thus satisfied
that an interpretation of the statutory crime of sexual assault to require physical
force in addition to that entailed in an act of involuntary or unwanted sexual
penetration would be fundamentally inconsistent with the legislative purpose to
eliminate any consideration of whether the victim resisted or expressed nonconsent.
Id.
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affirmative and freely given permission. 9 1
In theory, adopting a new standard that focuses on the affirmative
expressions of consent carries a potential promise for a profound reform
in rape law. However, the decision in MTS., demonstrates that in
practice, the hopeful concept of affirmative consent has evolved into an
affirmative permission standard. The key question here is whether an
affirmative consent standard and an affirmative permission standard are,
in fact, similar, and if not what the practical implications are. The
decision in M T.S. merely assumes that permission and consent
necessarily capture the same concepts. These terms are synonymous
only if we accept the premise that consent means merely a permissiongiving act. In contrast, if consent encompasses an additional component
above and beyond mere permission, then "affirmative permission" does
not equal affirmative consent. The latter view is correct since consent
and permission are not synonymous. Moreover, transforming
affirmative consent into an affirmative permission standard has
arguably narrowed the meaning of consent as the limited term
"permission" fails to capture the full meaning of genuine consent.
Little notice has been taken, in the aftermath to MT.S., of what the
affirmative permission standard entails. The implications in those cases
where consent is merely apparent, as well as the outcome of the
practical gap between affirmative permission and affirmative consent,
have not been considered. The affirmative permission standard has
raised a scholarly debate on whether it should be the controlling legal
standard to determine when consent is established.9 2 The above debate
has arguably distracted our attention from posing a key question: What
are the implications of applying the current affirmative permission
standard in court decisions? These issues have never been thoroughly
challenged in M T.S. itself or in subsequent decisions that followed. The
result is that these decisions have not grasped the failure of the
affirmative permission standard to offer a clear boundary between
apparent permission, resulting in mere submission, and genuine consent,
as the following case illustrates.
91. Id.
92. See, e.g., David Bryden, Redefining Rape, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 317, 398 (2000)
(arguing that affirmative permission which is expressed through behavior should suffice to
establish the complainant's consent). See also Michelle J. Anderson, Negotiating Sex, 78 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1401, 1417-20 (2005) (arguing that reforms requiring affirmative permission, by
words or conduct, do not go far enough). Anderson further contends that this approach relies on
a man's ability to infer actual willingness from a woman's body language. Id. at 1417-19. Yet,
studies indicate that men consistently misinterpret women's nonverbal behavior. Id. Anderson
goes on to suggest that "[n]ot only must rape law abolish the force and resistance requirements,
it must also abolish the non consent requirement .... In its place the law ... would require only
what conscientious and humane partners already have: a communicative exchange, before
penetration occurs, about whether they want to engage in sexual intercourse."
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B. Apparent Consent in State v. Baby
The landmark decision in State v. Baby,93 a 2008 Maryland case,
illustrates why the current judicial discourse on consent to sexual
relations is flawed and misguided. To make this point, we must examine
in detail the graphic description of the sequence of events in this case.
The complainant, J.L., an 18-year-old college student, testified that she
and her friend Lacey met Mike and Baby at a restaurant, and she agreed
to give them a ride. 94 When Lacey left, J.L was left alone with both
perpetrators. 95 She testified that they told her to park the car and took
her cell phone. 96 According to J.L., both perpetrators attempted to have
sex with her, and she found herself sitting in the back seat of the car
with Baby removing her jeans and Mike sitting on her chest, attempting
to place his penis in her mouth. After telling them to stop, they moved
J.L. around so that her body was in Baby's lap as he held her arms.
Mike tried to insert his penis into her vagina but mistakenly inserted it
into her rectum. 98 J.L. further testified that she was told she would not
be able to leave until both men were done having sex with her. 99 While
Mike attempted to have intercourse, Baby held her arms and inserted his
fingers into her vagina.o00 At that point, Baby got out of the car, leaving
Mike alone with J.L.10 She then testified that Mike inserted his fingers
and then his penis into her vagina.102 After Mike finished having sex
with her, he left the car.10 3 Mike told Baby that he just had sex with her,
then Baby got into the car and told J.L., "[I]t's my turn now."l04 J.L.
testified that Baby said, " A]re you going to let me hit it[?]" and "I
don't want to rape you."' J.L. responded by saying that he could as
long as he stopped when she told him to.106 J.L. testified that he "got on
top of me and . . . it hurt." 0 7 She testified that she "yelled stop, that it
hurt." 0 8 According to J.L. "that's when he kept pushing it in[,] and I
93. See generally Baby v. State, 946 A.2d 463, 466-68 (Md. 2008) (articulating the
factual background that stands at the basis of the holding).
94. Id. at 466.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 466-67.
98. Id. at 467.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id
108. Id.
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was pushing his knees to get [him] off me."'
According to Baby's testimony, neither he nor Mike touched J.L.
before Baby got out of the car and left Mike and J.L. together."o Baby
testified that when he came back into the car, he asked J.L. whether she
was "going to let him hit that," and she said that he could as long as he
stopped when she told him to, which he claimed he did right away."'
Baby also said that when he told J.L., "I don't want to rape you," this
was to confirm the permission he thought he had."12
The complainant's and defendant's accounts differ on two main
points. First, the complainant testified that initially both perpetrators
attempted to have sex with her at the same time, and that she explicitly
told them to stop." 3 According to her testimony, they decided to have
sex with her separately only after their attempts were unsuccessful." 4
Baby, in contrast, denied the joint sexual acts, claiming that neither he
nor the other defendant attempted to have sex with the complainant
while they were all together in the car.'15 Second, the complainant's and
Baby's versions also diverge regarding the sequence of events that
occurred after the complainant withdrew her permission. While the
defendant claimed that he stopped right after she told him to, she
claimed that he ignored her demand and continued the penetration.116
Surprisingly, the complainant's and defendant's accounts on the
particular point of initial permission were similar." 7 They both agreed
that the complainant initially gave verbal permission to the sexual act." 8
The only difference in their accounts on this point was why the
permission was given. Under the complainant's account, she felt that
she did not have any choice but to submit.11 9 The defendant's version
was that he understood the verbal permission to be consent to engage in

sexual acts with him.120
The2*ury accepted the defendant's account that initial consent was
given. However, they concluded that as intercourse proceeded, the
complainant withdrew her consent, and demanded that the defendant

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id.
Id.at468.
Id. at 469-70.
Id. at 469.
Id. at 466-68.
Id. at 467.
Id. at 468-69.
Id. at 466-70.
Id. at 467, 469.
Id
Id. at 467.
Id. at 468-69.
Id. at 472.

2010]

SEXUAL ABUSE OF POWER

I03

stop, which he did not.122 These factual determinations framed the legal
question accordingly: May a complainant who initially consented to sex
withdraw her consent at a later point during the intercourse? 23 The trial
court answered this question in the negative, but the appellate court
reversed. It held that a complainant may withdraw her consent at any
point throughout the intercourse. 124
The crux of the argument here is to offer an alternative reading of
this case. Rather than viewing Baby as a case demonstrating withdrawn
consent, as it is currently viewed, let me suggest that consent was never
obtained under the above circumstances. While the question of
withdrawn consent during sexual intercourse raises several interesting
issues, it is not the one focused on here because I read the facts of this
case quite differently. Instead, this Article challenges the jury's
fundamental premise that the sexual acts were consensual in the
beginning but became nonconsensual after the complainant changed her
mind.125 Rather than viewing the facts through the lens of withdrawn
consent, this Article contends that a more nuanced reading of the facts
shows that the case is yet another example of nonconsensual sexual
relations.
Under this alternative account, the legal issue in Baby was
erroneously framed. Rather than asking whether a complainant may
withdraw her consent once it has been offered, the proper question
should have been whether the sexual acts between the complainant and
the defendant truly consensual. The jury should have asked themselves
some additional questions: Did the complainant express, at any point in
the sexual encounter, her willingness to engage in the sexual acts? Most
importantly, does verbal permission necessarily connote consent
notwithstanding the underlying circumstances that indicate otherwise?
Nonetheless, the jury in Baby failed to consider these additional
questions. Had it done so, the Article argues, the answers would have
been in the negative. Under the circumstances, and in light of the
backdrop against which permission was given, consent to sex was never
given. This Article therefore contends that the jury got it wrong by
misinterpreting the complainant's response to the perpetrator's coercive
conduct.
This alternative reading begs the question: Should consent require a
willingness in addition to permission? Interestingly, the prosecution's

122. See id. at 471-72 (concluding that post-penetration withdrawal of consent negates
initial consent for the purposes of sexual offense crimes, and when coupled with the other
elements, may constitute the crime of rape).
123. Id. at 473.
124. Id. at 472-73, 486.
125. Id. at 471-72.
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initial premise was that there was no consent to begin with.126 The state
argued that the complainant's reactions indicated only apparent consent
and that no volitional consent was ever given. 127 However, the jury
rejected this theory. 128 Why?
What led the jury to conclude that the complainant's submission to
unwanted sexual demands qualified as consensual sex? Why did they
believe that the complainant initially consented to the sexual acts when
the underlying circumstances suggest that permission was only
apparent? Moreover, why did they view the perpetrator's coercive
conduct as permissible sexual conduct?
The answers to these questions point to the close links between the
jury's misguided view on consent and the application of the affirmative
permission standard. The notion of consent to sex as a permissiongiving act figured prominently in the jury's understanding of what
consent means in Baby, and it is precisely what led them to erroneously
conclude that the sexual acts were consensual.1 29 This type of verbal
permission requires us to reconsider the practical implications of the
affirmative permission standard, because the jury's belief that technical
authorization of the sexual acts amount to legal consent to sexual
relations is the direct result of applying this standard.130
The jury in Baby failed to grasp that verbal permission, in itself, does
not qualify as genuine consent, because permission and consent are not
synonymous. While permission captures only the objective aspect of
authorizing the sexual act, consent is a broader concept that also
embodies a subjective aspect, namely, willingness.
1. Apparent Consent Defined
The result of applying the affirmative permission standard in Baby is
failing to notice that consent is often merely apparent. Legal scholars, as
well as courts, have given the problem of apparent consent in rape cases
scant attention.' 3 1 The decision in Baby calls for a clear definition of the
problem of apparent consent: permission or authorization to engage in
126. Id at 466-68.
127. See id. at 473; see also Baby v. State, 916 A.2d 410, 421 (Md. 2007) (offering some
insights on the prosecution's theory regarding the complainant's consent).
128. See Baby, 946 A.2d at 471-72.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. Scholars address the problem of apparent consent in other contexts, particularly in the
context of trafficking and prostitution. See, e.g., Janet Halley et al., From the Internationalto
the Local in Feminist Legal Responses to Rape, Prostitution/Sex Work, and Sex Trafficking:
Four Studies in Contemporary Governance Feminism, 29 HARv. J.L. & GENDER 335, 351
(2006) (arguing that the apparent consent to trafficking cannot be viewed as legally valid
consent).
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sexual acts, either by the complainant's express words or by her
behavior, which is given for any reason other than the complainant's
willingness.
Apparent consent is prevalent in cases in which permission, verbal
or through behavior, is obtained. However, delving into why permission
was given indicates that the reason is not willingness to engage in
sexual acts. The affirmative permission standard leads us to the wrong
questions. In those cases in which we suspect that consent is merely
apparent, rather than asking whether permission to engage in sexual acts
was given, the key question we must ask instead is this: Why was
permission given? What were the reasons for giving permission?
Focusing on consent as merely an act of permission, participation, or
approval has distracted both the courts and commentators from asking
these crucial questions.
To get a handle on the question of apparent consent, we must call
into question the factors that prompted the complainant's apparent
consent. The key question becomes whether the reason for giving
permission is willing and wanting to engage in the sexual acts. If the
answer is that permission was given for any other reason, then consent
is not obtained since it is merely apparent. Consent is therefore genuine
only if it is given because the complainant is willing and wanting to
engage in sexual acts with the defendant.
Asking these questions might offer an important guideline in
distinguishing between genuine consent and apparent permission.
Articulating a series of circumstances and conditions under which
consent is merely apparent, notwithstanding an ostensible verbal
permission that might have been expressed, may do this. Many
jurisdictions currently acknowledge factors such as submission by force,
fear of violence, and threats to cause physical harm.' 32 But this list of
factors might be further expanded to include different types of fears of
non-violent harms, and in particular, submission by reason of lack of
any meaningful choices, or submission by reason of being placed in fear
of non-physical harm. These circumstances also include submission by
reason of abuse of power or authority, a problem the Article will
address in more detail in the following part.
In evaluating the complainant's reasons for giving permission in
Baby, we see that the reason is twofold. First, the lack of any
meaningful alternative course of action, and second, the fear of harmful
repercussions if permission is refused.13 3 The decision sharpens the
question of meaningful choices under coercive circumstances and
132. See generally SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 274-82 (discussing refusal of current law
to acknowledge additional forms of sexual abuses beyond those that demonstrate physical harm
or threats to use violence).
133. See generally Baby, 946 A.2d at 463.
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conditions that fall short of force and violence.
The evidence in Baby shows that the complainant unwillingly
submitted to the perpetrator's demands because she believed she had no
other choice.' 34 The complainant's testimony shifts our attention to the
basic premise: To be legally effective, consent must be freely given.
When asked by the prosecution whether she felt like she had a choice,
the complainant answered, "Not really."' 35 She also testified that she
just did whatever they said, feeling that she had no other choice.' 3 6 The
complainant stated that both perpetrators explicitly told her that she
would be free to leave only after they were done having sex with her.137
Consider the alternatives available to the complainant: Assuming she
had the free choice and that she refused to give permission, what would
have happened then? Most likely, the perpetrators would have forced
her into submission. What are the chances that an 18-year-old girl
would be able to overcome two 16-year-old males? The assumption that
the complainant could realistically refuse permission is therefore
significantly undermined. This conclusion casts a serious doubt on the
reason given for her submission.
In addition, we must consider the effect of the complainant's fear of
more harmful alternatives. One may ask: Fear of what? While the
complainant's testimony did not accuse the defendant of threatening to
harm her, the underlying circumstances would likely have led the
complainant to fear for her personal freedom (after the perpetrators told
her she would not be able to leave). When a victim is locked in a car at
night in a secluded area with two male perpetrators who clearly indicate
their desires to force sexual acts on her, her personal freedom is in
jeopardy, and the fear that physical force might come into play is more
than reasonable.
2. Myths and Stereotypes in the Permission Standard
The Baby decision illustrates that the affirmative permission
standard enables the persistent infusion of myths and stereotypes into
the judicial discourse. The problem of clearly defining consent goes
much deeper than the question of which legal standard to employ to
determine consent. A community's views as to what constitutes sexual
consent, as well as mistaken beliefs in what qualifies as consent,
continue to prove stronger than legal standards, because criminal cases
are decided by a jury. Juries make decisions about culpability based on
their personal, societal perceptions; the social norms they hold
134.
135.
136.
137.

See id. at 466-68.
See id. at 467.
Id.
Id.
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regarding the boundaries between legitimate and illegitimate sexual
practices; and how they define consent to sexual relations. Baby thus
is a vivid example in which the jury's perceptions resulted in mistakenly
viewing apparent permission as valid consent, based precisely on
relying on such myths and stereotypes. Myths and stereotypes about
"appropriate" sexual behavior shape the community's understanding of
sexual consent, and therefore directly affect ajury's perceptions.139
The affirmative permission standard allows the infusion of myths
and stereotypes into the judicial discourse because under this standard,
the complainant's demeanor plays a crucial role in determining whether
she gave permission to the sexual acts. 140 Allowing implied consent,
which might be inferred from the complainant's ambiguous behavior,
and refusing to hold that only explicit and unequivocal words amount to
consent prevents legal recognition of unwanted sexual intrusions.141
One of the most prominent drawbacks when juries infer implied consent
from the complainant's behavior rests on the problem of gender
stereotyping and gender myths; acknowledging implied consent based
on evaluating the complainant's demeanor is flawed precisely because it
rests on such myths and stereotypes.142
Legal scholars have long identified the infusion of myths and
stereotypes into rape laws. Michelle Anderson, for example, criticizes
the affirmative permission standard on that ground, by arguing that it
allows imputing "erotic innuendo and sexual intent where there is
none," thereby construct[ing] consent out of stereotype and hopeful
imagination."
David Archard addresses the same problem by
emphasizing the role of myths of rape in shaping societal and judicial

138. See generally Dan Kahan, Culture, Cognition, and Consent: Who Perceives What,
and Why in Acquaintance Rape, 158 U. PA. L. REv. 729, 765 (2010) (discussing a study in
which a mock-jury experiment demonstrated the juries' perceptions of facts concerning
acquaintance rape. The study shows that the juries' personal worldview proved stronger than
legal definitions of rape).
139. See Andrew E. Taslitz, ForgettingFreud: The Courts' Fear of the Subconscious in
Date Rape (and Other) Cases, 16 B.U. PUB. INT'L L.J. 145, 155 (2007) ("Even the most wellmeaning 'feminist' jurors may find that they have reasonable doubt about the . .. rape case .. . if
the tale told fits cultural stories about 'sluttish' women").
140. See Anderson, supra note 92, at 1412-14.
141. Id. at 1413-14.
142. See R. v. Ewanchuk, S.C.R. 330, 1999, Carswell Alta 100, 97 (Justice L'HeureuxDube of the Canadian Supreme Court addresses in detail the myths and stereotypes that are
embodied in rape law, rejecting the notion of implied consent by holding that: "One cannot
imply that once the complainant does not object to the massage in the context of ajob interview,
there is 'sufficient evidence' to support that the accused could honestly believe he had
permission to initiate sexual contact ... It would reflect the myth that women are presumptively
sexually accessible until they resist.").
143. Anderson, supra note 92, at 1406.
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perceptions. 1" Archard further addresses the judicial role in reinforcing
the myth that some women invite and provoke being raped. 145
The Baby decision offers an example of the ways in which these
myths and stereotypes infiltrate both the judicial discourse about rape
complainants' demeanor and juries' views on what qualifies as consent
to sexual relations. Interestingly, the Court of Special Appeals
mentioned in a footnote that although it cannot know precisely the
thought process of the jurors,
the evidence presented to the jury provided at least a rational
inference that (1) Lacey sensed that a sexual encounter was
contemplated by the two boys and chose to leave the trio; (2)
that, although J.L. certainly did not relinquish her right to refuse
appellant's sexual advances by climbing into the back seat of the
car, by agreeing to remain with the two boys, she had abandoned
the security provided by Lacey's presence; and (3) the earlier
conversations about sex and appellant's production of three
condoms should have been indicia of their intentions. All of the
foregoing evidence was before the jury for its consideration in
contradistinction to the State's theory that J.L., an eighteen-year144. See DAVID ARCHARD, SEXUAL CONSENT 131 (1998) (discussing the effect of myths
and stereotypes in current rape laws).
Myths of rape include the view that women [fantasize] about being rape
victims; that women mean "yes" even when they say "no"; that any woman
could successfully resist a rapist if she really wished to; that the sexually
experienced do not suffer harms when raped (or at least suffer lesser harms
than the sexually "innocent"); that women often deserve to be raped on account
of their conduct, dress, and demeanor; that rape by a stranger is worse than one
by an acquaintance. Stereotypes of sexuality include the view of women as
passive, disposed submissively to surrender to the sexual advances of active
men, the view that sexual love consists in the "possession" by a man of a
woman, and that heterosexual sexual activity is paradigmatically penetrative
coitus.
Id.
145.

Id. at 139.
A crime is no less unwelcome or serious in its effects, or need it be any less
deliberate or malicious in its commission, for occurring in circumstances which
the complainant helped to [realize]. Yet judges who spoke of women "inviting"
or "provoking" a rape would go on to cite such contributory behavior as a
reason for regarding the rape as less grave or the rapist as less culpable. It adds
judicial insult to criminal injury to be told that one is the part author of a crime
one did not seek and which in consequence is supposed to be a lesser one.

Id.
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old college student, was tricked by two sixteen-year-old high

school students.146
By this language, the Court insinuates, not so subtly, that when a
complainant accompanied the defendants to a secluded area by her
choice, abandoning the security of her friend who did not like the sexual
suggestions and left the scene ahead of time, she knowingly exposed
herself to certain risks flowing from her own behavior. The Court
further makes an additional gendered perception stereotyping remark
regarding the age difference between the parties. The Court alludes to
the fact that the complainant was an allegedly experienced 18-year-old
college student, while the perpetrators were 16-year-old high school
"boys." 47 This remark implies that the young, inexperienced "boys"
could not have sexually abused the older and supposedly more
experienced "woman."
Revisiting these unsettling comments, silently buried in a footnote,
requires us to question the gender-based myths and stereotypes that
might be lurking in these statements. These disturbing views made by
an appellate judge help reinforce the myth that the complainant invited
and encouraged the sexual offense, thus her claims are less worthy of
belief. The judge's rhetoric illustrates a case in which "judicial insult [is
added] to criminal injury" by suggesting that the complainant in fact
contributed by her own "risky" behavior to being raped and thus
brought it on herself.148 This view reinforces the myth that the
complainant's contributory behavior lessens the guilt of the defendant.
3. Making Things Worse?
At first glance, adopting the affirmative permission standard has left
us precisely where we were prior to its adoption: passive acquiescence
in sexual demands is still viewed as consent to sex. Perhaps, though, the
implications of the Baby decision might be even more far-reaching. The
above conclusions may be taken a bit further, by suggesting an even
bolder claim, namely, that the affirmative permission standard not only
does not offer a better standard to determine when consent is
established, but, in some cases, the standard might even result in
making things worse. This might happen in cases with features similar
to Baby's, in which verbal permission is given, but the evidence
suggests that it is merely apparent.

146. See Baby v. State, 916 A.2d 410, 421 n.1 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007).
147. See id.
148. See, e.g., ARCHARD, supra note 144, at 139 ("[J]udicial insult is added to criminal
injury.").
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Hypothetically applying the affirmative permission standard in State
v. Smithl 49 suggests that the outcome in this case might have been
different had this standard been applied. Smith is a 1989 Connecticut
case that was decided three years prior to articulating the affirmative
permission standard in MT.S. 150 The defendant in Smith invited the
complainant back to his apartment where he made sexual advances
toward her. 15 ' Though the complainant repeatedly rejected his advances,
the defendant persisted.152 Testifying that she was scared, the
complainant believed the defendant was determined to have sex with
her and would hurt her if she resisted.' 5 3 The complainant understood
that her only choice was "to go along with it."' 54 She further testified
that after she decided to "give in," she tried to convince the defendant
that she was not going to fight and was going to enjoy it.15 5
Comparing and contrasting Smith and Baby suggests striking
similarities between these cases: the complainants decided to give in by
submitting to unwanted sexual demands.156 They both did so due to
their belief that, under the circumstances, they did not have any
alternative.1 5 7 Furthermore, both complainants submitted under no
explicit threat of harm to them if they failed to engage in sex with the
perpetrators.' 5 8 However, in both cases, the perpetrators clearly
conveyed to the complainants the message that they had no other choice
but to submit. While in Baby, the perpetrators told the complainant that
she would not be able to leave until they were both done having sex
with her;159 in Smith, the perpetrator told the complainant that he could
make it either harder or easier on her.' 60 Most importantly, in both
cases, the complainants verbally expressed permission to engage in the
sexual act. In Baby, the complainant told the perpetrator that he could
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

See State v. Smith, 554 A.2d 713, 713 (1989).
Id.
Id. at 714.
Id.
Id.
At first I didn't know what to do. I did spit in his face and he didn't even take it
seriously. Then I tried kicking him off, which was to no avail. He was way too
big for me ... . He told me he could make it hard on me or I could make it easy
on myself, which I finally decided was probably my best bet.

Id.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id.
Id.
Id.; Baby v. State, 916 A.2d 410,467 (1989).
Smith, 554 A.2d at 714; Baby, 946 A.2d at 467.
Smith, 554 A.2d at 714; Baby, 946 A.2d at 467.
Baby, 946 A.2d at 467.
Smith, 554 A.2d at 714.
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penetrate her so long as he stopped when she told him to.161 In Smith,
the complainant testified that she told the perpetrator that she "was
going to go along with him and enjoy it.l 62 Indeed, verbal permission
to engage in the sexual acts was given in both cases. Yet, while in Baby,
the jury found that the complainant initially consented to sex by giving
a verbal permission to the defendant,163 the Smith jury found that giving
in and submitting to unwanted sexual demands failed to demonstrate
consent.164 Why then did similar facts result in contradictory holdings?
Why was submission to unwanted sexual demands in one case viewed
as consent while acquiescing in the other case resulted in determining
that sex was non-consensual?
One possible explanation for this difference is that in Smith the jury
understood the defendant's statement that he "'could make it hard' for
her if she continued to resist" as a threat of physical injury.' 6 5 These
words were sufficient, in the jury's view, to meet the element of
"compel[ling] another person to engage in sexual intercourse by the use
of force . .. or by the threat of use of force . .. which reasonably causes

such a person to fear physical injury" as defined by Connecticut rape
law.' 66 But the evidence in Smith shows that no explicit threat to
physical harm was ever expressed in this case. 167 However, the jury
accepted the complainant's account that she decided to submit to
unwanted sexual acts since she felt that no other choice was available to
her.168 But why were the similar surrounding circumstances in Baby
viewed differently? The jury in Baby had plenty of evidence from which
to infer the complainant gave in to the perpetrators' sexual demands
after being placed in fear of harm and based on her belief that she had
no other choice but to submit after being told she would be free to leave
only after consummation. The jury, however, explicitly refused to take
that path.169
Why did the Baby jury conclude that the complainant communicated
her consent to sex under these compelling circumstances? The
explanation to the different outcomes might rest on applying the
161. Baby, 946 A.2d at 467.
162. Smith, 554 A.2d at 714.
163. Baby, 946 A.2d at 471-72.
164. Smith, 554 A.2d at 718.
165. Id. at 714, 718.
166. The defendant was convicted under Title 53a-70: Sexual assault in the first degree,
which was defined under Connecticut General Statues Annotated as: "when such person (1)
compels another person to engage in sexual intercourse by the use of force against such other
person or a third person, or by the threat of use of force against such other person ... which
reasonably causes such person to fear physical injury to such person, . . ." Id.
167. Smith, 554 A.2d at 714.
168. Id.
169. See Baby v. State, 916 A.2d 410,467 (1989).
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affirmative permission standard. The Baby jury relied heavily on the
fact that the complainant verbally authorized the sexual act.' 0 Under
the jury's account, and based on the affirmative permission standard,
the act of verbal permission rendered the complainant's submission
consensual sex. In Smith, however, the complainant gave the same
verbal permission. 1 But here, the jury intuitively understood that
permission was merely apparent, and refused to acknowledge this type
of technical authorization under the compelling circumstances as
consensual sex. The difference was that Smith was decided before the
affirmative permission standard was adopted. Thus, it had not occurred
to the jury that the apparent verbal permission given by the complainant
may qualify as consent to sex. Had the affirmative permission standard
been the controlling legal standard when Smith was decided, the same
jury might have reached a different result.
Comparing and contrasting these cases suggests that not only does
the affirmative permission standard fail to accomplish a significant
reform in rape law, it might also harm complainants whose apparent
verbal permission is erroneously viewed as communicating affirmative
consent. Under this alternative reading, the affirmative permission
standard significantly contributed to confusing the jury, by leading them
to conclude that a technical act of verbal permission is sufficient to
determine consent to sexual relations. This standard, therefore, resulted
in masking the difference between apparent and genuine consent.
Adopting the affirmative permission standard thus not only failed to
result in a better standard, it made things worse, at least in certain cases.
The Baby decision thus illustrates the drawbacks to the affirmative
permission standard as it is currently construed pursuant to the decision
in M T.S., and requires that we re-evaluate its implications. This
standard fails to offer an adequate legal criterion to determine when
genuine consent is established, to acknowledge the harms that result
from apparent permission, and to provide any substantive guidelines on
where to draw the line between criminal conduct and legitimate sexual
conduct. The unsettling view on consent in Baby demonstrates that
developing an alternative consent standard that can distinguish between
mere permission and genuine consent is a much-needed step.
C. Toward a Modified Definition of Consent
Having noted the shortcomings in current views on consent to sexual
relations sharpens the need to articulate the necessary elements that
define genuine consent. The problem lies not in an affirmative consent
170.
171.

Id. at 471-72.
Seeid.at467,471-72.
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standard itself, but rather in the current understanding of consent, which
depends heavily on narrowly interpreting consent merely as an objective
act of permission-giving. The shift from a negative standard, such as
verbal resistance, toward a positive standard, such as affirmative
consent, is a welcome one. However, a robust application of a
meaningful affirmative consent standard is still needed. This alternative
standard draws on a modified definition of consent, which incorporates
the following crucial components.
1. Mutuality
How should an ideal model of consent to sexual relations look?
After cautiously articulating the outer boundaries of consent by
removing the nonconsensual and problematic sexual relationships in
which consent is questionable, Justice Kennedy, in Lawrence, offers his
view: "two adults who, with full and mutual consent from each other,
engaged in sexual practices."l 72 Lawrence depicts an idealistic role
model for consent to sexual relations, and applies it where consent was
genuine; no one challenged the validity of this consent by claiming that
the sexual relations were harmful in any way.' 73 While in Lawrence
itself, there was no complainant who claimed that sex was
nonconsensual, we must look at its language to better capture what is
wrong in the more complex cases where a complainant claims that
genuine consent was missing. Looking at the idealized view of consent
to sexual relations can help us ain important insights into what
elements consent must incorporate.' 4
Lawrence's language draws our attention to the central idea of
mutuality in sexual relationships. It reminds us that when considering
criminalizing abusive relationships, we should always keep in mind
172. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
173. See id. at 564 (stating that "The petitioners were adults at the time of the alleged
offense. Their conduct was in private and consensual.).
174.

See generally JOHN GARDNER, OFFENSES AND DEFENSES 24 (2007).

The view defended here, by contrast, is not essentialist about sex. It only trades
on the mere fact that an idealized view of sex-which we did not endorse and
which indeed may not be endorsed vary widely nowadays-nevertheless still
colours the social meaning of various actions, including, most notably, actions
which appropriate and subvert that ideal.
Id. n.28. Gardner compares and contrasts his views on rape with the approach taken by Lois
Pineau. Lois Pineau, Date Rape: A Feminist Analysis, 8 L. & PmL. 217 (1989). Gardner argues
that Pineau endorses a particular idealized view of sex and hence becomes what he calls
essentialist. GARDNER, supra, at 24 n.28. Gardner however, merely suggests that the ideal view
of sexual relations may color our understanding about what is acceptable and what is not. See
id.
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what typical sexual relationships between sexual partners look like.
Revisiting cases such as Baby raises the following question: Do we
normally view sexual relations as resulting from a permission-giving
act? The answer is probably no. However, what we do envision is both
parties making a mutual decision to engage in sexual relations with each
other. The two must agree on what they are going to do. The ideas of
mutuality and agreement stand at the core of normal sexual relations.
The same ideas are also essential in cases in which the complainant
submitted to unwanted sexual demands.175
Of course, we must acknowledge that many sexual relationships do
not resemble this model. Capturing the underlying features of an ideal
model for sexual relationships sharpens the role of a mutual agreement
as a crucial component in any sexual relationship. It reminds us that this
is one of the missing components from the previous discussion. A
consideration of the surrounding circumstances in Baby illustrates that
the complainant's apparent permission was not a result of the parties'
mutual decision to engage in sex. 7 6
In addition, requiring mutuality ensures the non-exploitative nature
of the sexual relations. Incorporating the proposed components within a
definition of consent would effectively secure the requirement that
175. Cf Chamallas,supra note 75, at 862; see also Pineau,supra note 174, at 236-39; Eva
Feder Kittay, AH! My Foolish Heart: A Reply to Alan Soble's "Antioch's 'Sexual Offenses
Policy': A PhilosophicalExploration," 28 J. Soc. PHIL. 153 (1997); ELIZABETH ANDERSON,
VALUE IN ETHics AND EcoNOMics (Harvard Univ. Press 1993). The idea of incorporating
mutuality in sexual relationships has been suggested before, mainly in proposals to add an
additional requirement to the definition of consent, sometimes referred to as "consent plus"
models. ALAN WERTHEIMER, CONSENT TO SEXUAL RELATIONS 135-39 (2003) (discussing

previous proposals to add an additional component to the definition of consent and coining the
term "consent plus" to address them). Many scholars pointed out that consent in itself is unable
to draw a clear line between legitimate and illegal sexual conduct. See, e.g., Martha Chamallas,
Consent, Equality and the Legal Control ofSexual Conduct, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 777, 784 (1988)
(positing that the notion of consent should be replaced by that of mutuality as the touchstone of
acceptable sex: "Sex used for more external purposes such as financial gain, prestige or power is
regarded as exploitative and immoral, regardless of whether the parties have engaged
voluntarily in the encounter"). They therefore proposed an additional component to supplement
consent, where something more than a mere token of acquiescence or even affirmation in the
absence of coercion is required in order to render sexual contact legally permissible. See
Vanessa E. Munro, ConstructingConsent: Legislative Freedom andLegitimizing the Constraint
in the Expression Sexual Autonomy, 41 AKRON L. REv. 923, 948 (2008). Predominantly, the
ideas draw on the concepts of reciprocity, mutuality, equality, communication, or the absence of
exploitation, alongside a token of valid consent. These proposals have been widely criticized.
See WERTHEIMER, supra note 39, at 135-39 (characterizing these proposals as "consent plus"
models and criticizing the strong reciprocity requirement). Wertheimer criticizes the "consent
plus" models by arguing that these theories do not provide a refurbished model for consent, but
rather overriding consent).
176. See generally Anderson, supra note 92, at 1425 (discussing the role of an agreement
under a negotiation model).
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sexual acts do not exploit complainants' limited choices. Moreover,
mutual agreement is the ultimate safeguard of sexual integrity. Any rape
law reform that attempts to provide stronger safeguards to promote a
right to sexual integrity, as well as a right to remain free from sexual
coercion, must take into account the mutuality notion in sexual
relationships.1 7 Yet, this feature is not embodied in the current
affirmative permission standard.
2. Willingness
What else do we envision when thinking about typical sexual
relationships? We normally think of sexual relations in terms of
wanting, wishing, desiring, and willing, rather than using the permission
or authorization language. As the Baby analysis demonstrates, the
much-needed component currently missing from the definition of
consent must incorporate the subjective aspect of consent, namely, the
parties' willingness to engage in sexual acts with each other. While
judicial rhetoric often states that consent incorporates both the
subjective as well as the objective element, actual holdings of cases
demonstrate that the objective aspect alone is taken into account. 178
It is time to revisit the claim that unwanted sexual acts become
synonymous with nonconsensual sexual acts. One necessary caveat to
clarify this claim: The proposed construct advocated here suggests that
unwanted sexual acts become synonymous with nonconsensual ones
provided that the complainant's unwillingness to engage in sexual
relations is objectively manifested to the perpetrator. This Article does
not challenge the basic premise that to convict a perpetrator of a sexual
offense, the complainant's lack of consent must be clearly and expressly
manifested. However, this Article suggests that rather than requiring the
complainant to demonstrate objective permission, she would be required
to objectively express willingness. Thus, when she objectively
manifests to the perpetrator her unwillingness, engaging in sexual
activity becomes non-consensual.
The modified definition of consent acknowledges that the law should
not uphold the distinction between unwanted and nonconsensual sex.
Instead, it must adopt an understanding that equates wanting with
consenting. When one party does not want to engage in sex with the
other and does not express any willingness to do so, then sexual
relations between them become not only unwanted but also nonconsensual.
177.

See Nicola Lacey, Unspeakable Subjects, Impossible Rights: Sexuality, Integrity, and

CriminalLaw, 11 CANADIAN J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 47, 63 (1998) (discussing the right to sexual

integrity in rape laws).
178. See, e.g., State v. Baby, 946 A.2d 463,467 (Md. 2008).
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3. Rejecting Implied Consent
Taking the complainant's subjective state of mind seriously requires
that her willingness must be explicitly communicated; it cannot be
implied or imputed through her behavior. Considering whether a
complainant actually wanted the sexual acts to take place demands that
her willingness must be determined based on clear and unambiguous
expressions. This is another missing element in the current
understanding of consent. The affirmative permission standard is flawed
because it enables consent to be inferred from the complainant's
equivocal behavior. Given the difficulties stemming from determining
how the perpetrator interpreted the complainant's behavior at the time
of intercourse, and the problems that arise in evaluating a defendant's
claim that he believed the complainant consented, a necessary approach
would be to require express consent before intercourse.
A modified definition of consent must acknowledge that allowing
implied consent contributes and reinforces gendered stereotypes. It
enables the jury, as well as the judiciary, to rely on misguided perceptions
of what types of behavior qualify as consent. This results in erroneously
viewing apparent permission as consent. Rape complainants should rely
on a judiciary free from stereotypes and gender-biased assumptions.
Allowing the infiltration of judicial rhetoric where obsolete myths and
stereotypes are reinforced violates a complainant's right not to have her
behavior judged based on incorrect perceptions. Moreover, true reform
can never be accomplished if the law enables consent to be determined
based on ambiguous behavior. A modified definition of consent must
therefore reject implied consent. The complainant's willingness should be
clear through explicit and unequivocal language. 79

IV.

THE LINKS BETWEEN SEXUAL ABUSE OF POWER AND
CONSENT DEFINITION

The previous analysis explored the overall definition of consent to
sex and the broader implications that a modified definition of consent
would have on regulating sexual misconduct in general. Armed with
these insights, the following section moves from this general
understanding of consent to the more specific consideration of this
179. See generally R. v. Ewanchuk, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 330 (Can.) (considering the definition
of consent through the comparative law's lens shows that foreign judicial systems have. already
taken similar steps in that direction). The Canadian Supreme Court held in Ewanchuk that
,consent is a subjective state of mind, and the complainant's willingness is an inherent
component in determining consent to sexual relationships. Id. It further held that consent cannot
be implied from silence, passivity, or ambiguous behavior).
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definition in particular cases. It revisits the problem of sexual abuse of
power by applying the proposed definition of consent to these abuses.
This application exposes the links between sexual abuse of power
and the modified definition of consent, in that consent is not obtained
when submission to unwanted sex is induced by abuse of power. Sexual
relations cannot be viewed as consensual whenever fears of harm,
coercive pressure, and exploitation of imbalances in power prompt the
complainant's acquiescence to the perpetrator's sexual demands. The
nonconsensual sex element is a main feature that characterizes all
sexual abuses of power in these settings, which demonstrates why they
justify criminalization. These links further highlight the problem
identified earlier of apparent consent to sexual relations induced by
reasons other than willingness.
A. Consent Not Obtained When Induced by Abuse ofPower
In professional and institutional settings, acquiescence to sexual
activity is often coupled with no real evidence of willingness.'so
Reluctant submission is particularly prevalent when disparities in
powers are exploited. Mere submission to unwanted sexual acts cannot
and should not constitute consent in the legal sense. Why is consent not
obtained under these circumstances? It is not obtained because engaging
in sexual acts under circumstances that indicate exploitation of
imbalances in powers does not demonstrate the complainant's
willingness to engage in these acts. Consent is not obtained because
submission is obtained through the perpetrator's one-sided abuse of
power rather than through mutual agreement. Thus, the ostensible
permission, which is affected heavily by fears, pressures, and
constraints, cannot be viewed as consent.
The first reason that consent is not obtained when imbalances in
power are exploited focuses on the complainant's state of mind and
stems from the key features that define genuine consent; the
complainant's willingness is missing whenever sexual abuse of power
induces submission. The second reason that consent is not obtained in
such a situation draws on the features of the perpetrator's conduct. A
common feature of many sexual relations that occur in professional and
institutional settings is that submission stems from the perpetrator's
sexual abuse of power rather than from the complainant's consent. The
abuse of power merely implicates the perpetrator's unilateral act and
fails to consider whether the complainant wants and welcomes the
180. See, e.g., Terri Nicholas v. Anthony Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 510 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding
that: "Nothing is more destructive of human dignity than being forced to perform sexual acts
against one's will"); see also id. at 513 (stating that Nicholas performed the sexual acts on her
supervisor unwillingly).
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sexual acts. These features do not characterize the notion of consent
under its modified definition, namely, as an expression of willingness
and a mutual decision-making process.
The connections between sexual abuse of power and the definition of
consent are best illustrated by revisiting the U.S. Supreme Court's
seminal sexual harassment decision in Meritor v. Vinson' 8 1 and by
comparing it to Baby.182 In both cases consent was interpreted merely as
a permission-giving act. However, Baby is not about sexual abuse of
power stemming from professional and institutional relations, because
none was present there.' 83 Rather, the decision illustrates the
implications of apparent consent in the absence of meaningful choices
after the defendant had placed the complainant in fear of harm. Meritor,
on the other hand, provides a paradigmatic example of sexual abuse of
power stemming from professional relations. Here, the employee's
supervisor exploited a disparity of power to coerce sexual acts on her.184
Despite what appears to be an egregious rape case, criminal charges
were not brought. The Meritor court viewed these sexual acts as
consensual, albeit unwelcome, sexual relations.'ss
While Meritor and Baby might seem unrelated, both illustrate the
flawed definition of consent. Baby's narrow view on consent diverts our
attention from grasping that consent was not obtained in Meritor; while
verbal permission was given, the supervisor's coercive pressures were
not acknowledged. 186 Closely examining Meritor demonstrates that
consent was merely apparent because it was obtained by sexual abuse of
power.is7 Viewing consent merely as a permission-giving act in Baby
obfuscates that cases such as Meritor justify criminalization, because
the circumstances in Meritor indicate that the sexual acts were not only
unwelcome but also nonconsensual.
Cases such as Baby and Meritor thus represent different facets of the
problem of apparent consent, namely, ostensible permission to sexual
acts given because of a reason other than willingness. While in Baby,
permission was obtained through placing the complainant in fear of
harm by creating circumstances where she felt she had no choice but to
181. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
182. See Baby, 946 A.2d at 463.
183. Meritor; 477 U.S. at 59-60.
184. See id. at 64-65 (discussing the sequence of events that resulted in the victim's
submission to unwanted sexual relations).
185. See id. at 65-67 (distinguishing between unwelcome and nonconsensual sexual
relations). The Court itself addressed the criminal nature of the allegations by stating that:
"Respondent's allegations in this case . . . include not only pervasive harassment but also
criminal conduct of the most serious nature . . ." Id. at 67.
186. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 176 (noting that the Meritor court refused to hold
that "sexual demands from a person in authority are inherently coercive").
187. See Meritor,477 U.S. at 65-67.
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submit; in Meritor, permission was similarly induced by abuse of
power. The result in both cases should have been that consent was not
obtained. Instead, both courts viewed apparent permission as valid
consent.
These cases beg the question: Rather than asking whether permission
was given, should we ask why it was given? The key question here is
not whether a complainant voluntarily participated in the sexual acts,
but why she submitted to unwanted sexual demands. Whenever sexual
relations occur under professional and institutional settings, we must
look carefully at the factors that prompted the complainant's
permission. If this investigation reveals that permission was obtained by
any reason other than willingness, then the law must deem consent
absent. In particular, if the complainant's permission was induced
through the exploitation of the perpetrator's powerful position, then the
legal conclusion must be that consent is not obtained.
These circumstances highlight the links between the definition of
consent and sexual abuse of power. Acquiescence to unwanted sex
resulting from abuse of power cannot be viewed as an expression of free
will and therefore should not qualify as legal consent. This conclusion
rests on the presumption that consent must be based on an individual's
volition. Thus, the definition of consent must be modified to appreciate
the power relationships between the parties and the effects of
exploitation on making a volitional decision. Consent cannot be
obtained when the circumstances indicate that there was such an abuse
of the power disparity between the parties that the weaker party was not
in a position to choose freely, because she perceives that withholding
permission is not an option. Courts need to scrutinize whether the
apparent permission is given with genuine volition. Whenever sexual
abuse of power is established, the complainant's participation in the
sexual acts is not a result of a decision made with free wiH but rather
made due to the coercive pressures the perpetrator exerted over her.
Principles of sound public policy further support this position
because the law should not distinguish between physically
overwhelming the free will through violence and a non-physical
overwhelming of the free will. The free will is equally overwhelmed by
economic and professional threats as by the threat of physical violence.
The law should not deem a complainant's decision made under such
coercive pressures as a valid choice.' 89

188. State v. Baby, 946 A.2d 463, 467 (Md. 2008).
189. See, e.g., the Canadian court's holding in Ewanchuk (citing Saint-Laurent v. Htu,
[1994] R.J.Q. 69, 82 (Can.): "'Consent' is ... stripped off its defining characteristics when it is
applied to the submission, non-resistance, non-objection, or even apparent agreement, of a
deceived, unconscious or compelled will.").
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The implications of applying a modified definition of consent to
sexual abuse of power cases are straightforward. The fact that consent is
not obtained when induced by sexual abuse of power justifies
criminalizing sexual abuses of power in various professional and
institutional settings. This conclusion draws on the fundamental premise
for criminal regulation of sexuality, namely, that criminalization is
justified only when nonconsensual sexual relations are established
because of the harm they inflict on victims. 190
Under the current understandings of consent, most sexual abuses of
power are viewed as consensual because apparent permission is
typically obtained. There are only limited circumstances in which the
law deems absence of consent notwithstanding the complainant's
ostensible permission.191 These circumstances usually include the threat
or use of physical force. This view obfuscates the fact that the driving
force behind apparent permission in professional and institutional
settings is often the perpetrator's exploitation of power, rather than the
complainant's willingness.
The key implication of these problems is that sexual abuses of power
are not only examples of unwanted sexual relations; they also
demonstrate nonconsensual sexual relations, and should therefore be
criminalized like other forms of nonconsensual sex. Criminalizing
abuses of power may be accomplished only once the law adopts a
modified definition of consent that concedes that sexual abuses of
power demonstrate one form of nonconsensual sexual relations.
Moreover, criminalization is not justified under any other approach that
refuses to acknowledge that these cases amount to nonconsensual sex,
because non-consent is the predicate for regulating sexual misconduct.
Based on the links between abuse of power and the notion of
consent, this proposal suggests that the law articulates an additional
circumstance-other than submission by reasons of physical force,
explicit threats to harm, or placing a complainant in fear of non-physical
harm-under which consent is deemed absent. The additional
circumstance where consent is absent is submission due to the
exploitation of authority, power, trust, and dependence. This construct
adopts the premise that the law must find absence of consent not only
when explicit threats to harm a complainant are established, but also
when the exercise of authority through intimidation and coercive
pressures results in submission to unwanted sex.
190. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (holding that harmless sexual
conduct falls outside the scope of criminal regulation).
191. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Williams, 294 Pa. Super. 93, 439 A.2d 765, 767 (Pa.
Super. 1982) (demonstrating verbal permission in light of threat of violence: after the defendant
threatened to kill if she refused his sexual demands, the complainant told him that if he "wanted
to proceed with this, to go ahead," because she did not want him to hurt her).
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Capturing the common features shared by various forms of abuse of
power therefore justifies adopting a single comprehensive model for
criminalizing such abuses in professional and institutional settings.
Viewing these abuses under the same doctrinal framework offers a
powerful construct. It grants victims their right to sexual integrity and to
remain free of sexual coercion in the same way the law typically grants
protection to bodily integrity.
In contrast with previous reform proposals that consider
criminalizing threats to harm based on invalidating the legal power and
effectiveness of the victim's consent due to coercion, 192 the proposed
construct does not call for such a step. Instead, it suggests that consent
is not obtained when permission is induced by sexual abuse of power.
This view does not demand adopting a separate provision that negates
consent due to some defect, like coercion. The non-consent element is
an inner feature built into the sexual abuse of power determination. This
feature is particularly significant, because criminalizing abuses of power
would not result in weakening complainants by treating them like
incompetent victims whose consent is invalidated. Rather, it would
strengthen complainants by granting them powerful rights.
The proposed construct does not distinguish conceptually between
abuse of power by public officials and abuse of power by private actors,
such as employers who own their business and thus act on their own
behalf. The underlying feature that characterizes all forms of sexual
abuse of power-nonconsensual sexual relations-is equally established, regardless of the characteristics of either the perpetrators or the
complainants. In particular, consent is not obtained when submission is
induced by sexual abuse of power when the perpetrator is a private
employer, just as it is not obtained when the perpetrator is a public
official who exercises formal authority.
The final implication is that, in contrast with previous reforms,
criminalizing sexual abuse of competent adults, such as employees and
students does not solely rely on establishing threats to harm the
victims. 93 Instead, whenever abuse of power induces the complainant's
192.

See, e.g., WERTHEIAER, supra note 39, at 167.

[T]he single most important factor in determining when proposals nullify the
transformative power of consent on grounds of coercion is whether A proposes
to make B worse off than her moralized baseline, whether A's "declared
unilateral plan"-what A proposes to do if B does not accept A's proposalwould violate B's rights ...
Id.
193. See, e.g., SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 283 (distinguishing between victims who are
legally confined, incompetent, or minor victims and other victims not in these circumstances.
Criminalizing sexual abuse in the latter case relies solely on establishing threats to harm. See id.
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submission to unwanted sex, the perpetrator's act should be
criminalized. This holds notwithstanding the specific means and
techniques used to obtain the submission. Exposing the links between
abuse of power and consent demonstrates that inducing submission
through exploitation of power extends above and beyond threats to
harm. Placing a victim in fear of potential harm by creating a pressured
environment in professional and institutional settings is sufficient to
induce unwanted submission.
B. Legislative andJudicialEndeavors to Expand Criminalization
This analysis calls for examining the links between sexual abuse of
power and the definition of consent in one particular case which has not
yet been recognized as criminal conduct: sexual abuse of power in the
workplace. Scholars and courts alike have generally failed to
acknowledge that coerced sex in the workplace is example of sexual
abuse of power, and as such, should be criminalized. Instead, they have
treated coerced sexual acts in this setting merely as civil sexual

harassment.194

Viewing various abuses of power on a coercion continuum reveals
that an employee's submission to sexual acts with her supervisor and
employer may seem, at first glance, the least coercive of relations, and
criminalizing them may seem the most problematic. After all, the
complainants are competent adults whose ability to make free choices
regarding their sexual relations is ostensibly unlimited. It is precisely
because these types of relations have been traditionally viewed as the
least appropriate candidates for criminalization that we must pay special
attention not only to the coercive features that characterize them, but
also to the essential similarities that they share with other forms of
abuse of power. To better capture these features, let me start with two
examples, which have already acknowledged that coerced sexual
relations in the workplace amount to criminal conduct, and thus justify
criminalization.

Model Criminal Statute for Sexual Offenses, § 202, subsection (c)(5): consent is not freely given
when the actor obtains the victim's consent by threatening to inflict harm).
194. See generally Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83
CORNELL L. REv. 1169 (1998); Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong With Sexual Harassment?,
49 STAN. L. REv. 691 (1997); Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE
L.J. 1683 (1998). Although these scholars differ in their understanding of the harm caused by
sexual harassment, they share some core features; they focus on gender group-based harms, and
shift the focus away from the sexual and the personal aspects of the harassing conduct, and in
particular from each criminal aspects. See also Buchhandler-Raphael, supra note 42 (criticizing
the failure of current law to criminalize coerced submission in the workplace and in an academic
setting).
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1. Federal Law
Federal law indirectly criminalizes one form of coerced sexual
relations in the workplace. It does so when public officials, such as state
actors, exploit their official power to deprive individuals of their right to
remain free of sexual assault.195 Criminalization under federal law does
not rest directly on a separate provision that prohibits sexual abuse of
power. Rather, criminalization draws on section 242 of the U.S. Code: a
general constitutional-type provision that criminalizes the violation of
constitutionally protected rights.19 6 In United States v. Lanier, the U.S.
Supreme Court considered criminalizing the sexual offenses perpetrated
by a state judge against several employees of the court.19 7 Lanier abused
his power by sexually assaulting, in his chambers, court employees
employee applicants, and litigants over whom he had jurisdiction.19
Five women detailed similar accounts of sexual abuse of power by the
judge: they claimed that he threatened them with loss of child custody
and employment if they did not submit to his sexual demands.199 The
complainants in Lanier were not only litigants before the abusive judge
but also employees of the court over whom the judge exercised
professional authority. 200
The district court convicted Lanier of unconstitutional deprivation of
his victims' liberty rights without due process. 20 1 The Sixth Circuit
overturned the conviction, holding that although Lanier's conduct was
wrong, no prior case had placed him on notice that sexual assault by a
state jude would constitute a violation of the broadly worded federal
statute.
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the
Sixth Circuit had used an "unnecessarily high" standard to determine
that Lanier lacked sufficient notice that his conduct violated the right to
remain free from sexual assault. 203 The Court held that the same notice
standard applies to both civil and criminal cases. 204 The Court also
195. See 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1996), which provides: "Whoever, under color of any law,
statute, ordinance, regulation or custom willfully subjects any person .. . to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the
United States . .
196. Id.
197. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 261-62 (1997).
198. Id.at261.
199. Id.; see also DARCY O' BRIEN, POWER To HURT 504-16 (Harper Paperbacks 1997)
(1995); Darcy O' Brien, Court: Is Rape by a Judge a Federal Crime?, 17 NAT'L L.J., Al0
(1995).
200. Lanier, 520 U.S. at 261.
201. United States v. Lanier, 33 F. 3d 639, 645, 666 (6th Cir. 1994) (affirming the
judgment of the district court).
202. United States v. Lanier, 73 F.3d 1380, 1384 (6th Cir. 1996).
203. See Lanier,520 U.S. at 270.
204. Id. at 270-71 (confirming that § 1983 precedent may be used to establish that a
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rejected Lanier's arguments, which it deemed to be "plainly without
merit," including his contention that section 242 cannot be applied to
incidents "outside of a custodial setting." 205
The Lanier decision sets the stage for criminalizing sexual abuse of
power of employees by their employers, namely, state actors who hold
positions of authority over them. Its core significance, for the purposes
of this Article's analysis, rests on conceding that the exploitation of
power in the workplace may amount to criminal conduct. It opens a
door to acknowledging additional forms of sexual abuse of power in the
workplace as justifying criminalization.206 Under current views,
criminalizing sexual abuse of power in the workplace is an exception: in
contrast with other cases, in which coerced sexual relations in the
workplace are typically viewed as civil sexual harassment, the sexual
acts in the Lanier case are criminalized. Adopting the criminal law's
lens in the workplace offers a novel approach which is typically rejected
in this context. This innovative view calls for considering the expansion
of this framework to include additional abuses of power in the
workplace.
However, this reading of Lanier is not the prevalent view. The
scholarship analyzing the Lanier decision typically focuses on its
constitutional aspects, namely, interpreting sexual assault by a state
actor as a potential violation of a constitutionally protected right to
bodily integrity.207 Moreover, the scholarship analyzing the sexual
constitutional right is clearly established for purposes of criminal liability under § 242).
205. See id at 1223, 1228 n.7 (rejecting Lanier's arguments).
206. The Supreme Court has only set the stage for recognizing this type of sexual abuse as
a constitutional violation, namely, a deprivation of the right to remain free from sexual assault
without due process. The Supreme Court did not hold in this case that sexual assault of
employees and litigants by a judge amount to a constitutional violation. The Court has only
provided the guidelines, but not a practical conclusion on the constitutional issue, because it
remanded the case to the Sixth Circuit and did not apply the very standard it set. See id. at 272.
Lanier's flight precluded the Sixth Circuit from applying on remand the standard set by the
Supreme Court. See United States v. Lanier, 123 F.3d 945, 946 (6th Cir. 1997) (stating that the
court entered an order requiring the former judge to surrender himself to the U.S. Marshal,
which he failed to do). However, several circuits have held that sexual assault by a public
official amounts to deprivation of the constitutional right to liberty. See, e.g., Rogers v. City of
Little Rock, 152 F. 3d 790 (8th Cir. 1998) (a police officer who stopped the complainant for a
broken tail light, followed her home to locate the needed articles, and then raped her. The Eighth
Circuit held that Rogers's conduct amounted to a substantive due process violation, because the
officer's actions violated the victim's right to bodily integrity.); United States. v. Giordano, 260
F. Supp. 2d 477 (D. Conn. 2002) (denying a motion to dismiss in the case of a former city
mayor charged with depriving two children of rights and privileges secured by the constitution,
including the right to be free from sexual abuse).
207. See, e.g., Mary Anne Case, Reflections on ConstitutionalizingWomen's Equality, 90
CAL. L. REv. 765, 776 (2002) (addressing the constitutional aspects of the Lanier decision in
particular with respect to viewing the judge's conduct as violating individual's right to bodily
integrity).
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abuse of power by judges, who are state actors, typically focuses on
judges inappropriately exercising their judicial power over litigants who
appear before the court.20 8 This view may have caused the appellate
court to overlook that some of the judge's victims were employees of
the court, and that he was their supervisor. Thus, the additional context
in which this abuse occurred was overlooked. The further implications
of the Lanier decision on sexual abuses in the workplace have never
been thoroughly considered.
These views have distracted us from considering whether
criminalization may expand to include other forms of abuse of power in
professional and institutional settings, including in private workplaces.
This Article proposes that Lanier may offer the doctrinal basis for
expanding the scope of an abuse of power model to the workplace
setting beyond the circumstances in which the perpetrator is a state actor
who abuses an official authority. This view is based on acknowledging
that similar coercive pressures are exercised by powerful employers or
supervisors in various professional and institutional settings over
dependent employees, thus justifying the adoption of a similar criminal
prohibition.
2. Military Law
The U.S. military provides additional support for expanding criminal
regulation to include coerced sexual relations in a workplace. The
military justice system has recently taken a significant legislative step in
the direction of criminalizing sexual abuse of power, where exploiting
disparities in power, position, and rank induces submission. 2 09 A
amendment to the Uniforni Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)
incorporates the abuse of power model in its criminal provisions. 2 10 The
UCMJ Amendment distinguishes between rape and sexual assault; the
latter includes in its definition engaging in a sexual act by "threatening
or placing that other person in fear." 1 The phrase "threatening or
placing that other person in fear" is defined as: "a communication or
action that is of sufficient consequence to cause a reasonable fear that
non-compliance will result in the victim or another being subjected to a
lesser degree of harm than death, grievous bodily harm or
kidnapping."212 The provision further specifies what type of harm it
208. Id.
209. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-163, 119
Stat. 3136 (2005) [hereinafter UCMJ Amendment] (proscribing rape sexual assault, and other
sexual misconduct).
210. Id. § 920(t)(7)(B)(iii).
211. Id. § 920(c)(1)(A).
212. Id. § 920(t)(7)(A).
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encompasses, including a threat "through the use or abuse of military
position, rank, or authority, to affect or threaten to affect, either
positively or negatively, the military career of some person." 213 The
UCMJ Amendment also defines consent as "words or overt acts
indicating a freely given agreement to the sexual conduct at issue by a
competent person. . . . [L]ack of verbal or physical resistance or

submission resulting from the accused's use of force, threat of force or
placing another person in fear does not constitute consent." 2 14
This provision concedes that passive acquiescence, when prompted
by the dominance presented by the perpetrator's superior rank and
position, may constitute sexual coercion. The imbalances in powers play
a significant role under this account. Acknowledging that a threat
"through the use or abuse of military position, rank, or authority, to
affect or threaten to affect either positively or negatively, the military
career of some person" 1 justifies criminalization, the provision
provides an innovative approach. It eliminates the dubious, yet common
distinction between a threat, such as firing or demotion, which is often
considered as coercive, and an offer to provide a benefit in exchange for
sex, such as promotion, which is typically not considered as coercive.216
The UCMJ Amendment also attempts to extend the criminal
prohibitions above and beyond explicit threats to inflict nonphysical
harm, albeit unsuccessfully. It proscribes both actual threatening, as
well as placing a person in fear of a harm less than physical injury.217
The phrase "placing in fear" is substantially broader than the narrow
"threatening" language. Using the "placing in fear" language thus
acknowledges that coercive pressures stemming from the relations
between military commanders and soldiers also includes additional
forms of coercive impositions. It concedes that the coercive atmosphere
induced by the disparities in professional positions results in placing a
victim in fear of potential harm, which, in turn, induces submission to
unwanted sex. The reform, however, suffers from a significant
shortcoming. While it seems that the provision attempts to criminalize
sexual abuse of power above and beyond threats to harm, in practice,
213. Id. § 920(t)(7)(B)(iii).
214. Id. § 920(t)(14).
215. Id. § 920(t)(7)(B)(iii).
216. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 166 (contrasting offers and threats, and arguing
that "an offer to provide financial benefits in return for sex normally is not coercive if the
woman won't put her rights at risk by turning the proposal down"). See also WERTHEIMER,
supra note 39, at 167 (arguing that the most important factor in determining whether a proposal
is coercive is whether the perpetrator proposes to make the victim worse off than her
moralized baseline). If the answer is in the positive, then the proposal is coercive. Id. If,
however, he proposes to make her better off, compared to her moralized baseline, the offer is
not coercive. Id.
217. UCMJ Amendment, supra note 209, §§ 920(a)(3), 920(c)(1)(A), 920(t)(7)(B).
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this attempt succeeded only partially, because the wording itself merely
covers actual threats. Therefore, placing a victim in fear must be
established through the use of a threat. Any additional forms of
illegitimate coercive inducements, which fall short of threats, therefore
remain outside the scope of criminal regulation. 2 18
Despite this drawback, the UCMJ Amendment offers a potentially
comprehensive construct that relies heavily on an abuse of power
model. The innovative ideas it attempts to incorporate might provide
practical implications when considering extending similar reasoning
above and beyond the military context. The core significance of the
UCMJ Amendment lies in acknowledging that sexual abuses of power
in a workplace context, such as in the military, justify criminalization
when disparities in position are exploited to induce passive
acquiescence of subordinates.
Further, the military justice system adopts a contemporary definition
of what consent to sex is by requiring "words or overt acts indicating a
freely given agreement."21 The term "agreement" connotes a mutual
decision that both parties make together, as opposed to a one-sided
submission. It concedes that consent is not obtained when submission is
induced by abuse of power. This construct thus offers some innovative
views on the links between a modified definition of consent and the role
of sexual abuse of power in the coercion inquiry. It supports adopting a
similar model that would criminalize sexual abuses of power in
additional professional and institutional settings, including other
workplaces, provided that it clarifies that the "placing in fear"
requirement may be demonstrated by other forms of coercive pressures,
beyond threats to harm. Developing a similar theory to include such
additional settings is thus a main agenda for future reform, a goal that
this Article takes up in the fourth part.
3. Criminalization in Privately-Owned Workplaces
To consider criminalization in additional professional and
institutional settings, let us compare Lanier's facts with another
criminal case that demonstrates an unsuccessful attempt to broaden the
abuse of power model to the workplace. Recently, in State v.
DiPetrillo, a two courts examined the theory of applying a criminal
prohibition based on adopting an abuse of power model, but reached

different outcomes. 22 1
218.
219.
220.
221.
Court of

See id. § 920(t)(6) (providing that placing in fear is obtained only through threats).
Id. § 920(t)(14).
See State v. DiPetrillo, 922 A.2d 124, 126, 136 (R.I. 2007).
Id. at 126, 136 (defendant was convicted, following a bench trial in the Superior
Providence County, of first degree sexual assault and second degree sexual assault).
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In DiPetrillo, the complainant, "Jane," a nineteen-year-old college
student, was employed by the defendant as a draftsperson in his private
business.222 One afternoon, the defendant asked the complainant to stay
late to assist in a project. 223 Rather than begin working, the defendant
suggested they run some errands.224 He picked up take-out food, bought
beer, and stopped at his house to change clothes. 225 According to the
complainant, the defendant gave her four cans of beer, which she drank,
then grabbed her by the wrist, pulled her onto his lap, and began kissing
her. 2 At first, she did not resist and kissed him back, but then she
protested, telling him "we can't do this." 22 7 She also testified that the
defendant physically moved her from his lap onto the chair, and touched
her breast. 8 She testified that she was scared, tried to avoid the kissing,
and repeatedly told the defendant to stop, attempting to push his hands
away, but to no avail. 229 She further testified that he continued the
assault by penetrating her vagina with one of his fingers. 23 Scared and
in shock, she attempted to walk away, but he forcibly held her while he
masturbated.2 3231 The defendant's defense was consent. 232 He recounted
the same series of events but insisted that "Jane" willingly participated
in the sexual acts.2 33
DiPetrillo was prosecuted for second-degree sexual assault, which is
defined in Rhode Island as engaging "in sexual contact . .. [when t]he
accused uses force or coercion." 2 34 Following a four-day bench trial, the
court found the defendant guilty. 235 The trial court held that force or
coercion includes also implicit threats to inflict harm, and the
prosecution did not need to prove that the defendant actually or by
words spoken expressly threatened his victim, because a threat may be
implied as well as express.236 The victim need not have actually heard
any threatening words in order for her to have reasonably been in fear of
Defendant appealed to the Rhode Island Supreme Court, which rejected the legal basis for the
trial court's holding and remanded the case to reconsider the facts in accordance with the
Supreme Court's ruling. Id. at 136, 140.
222. Id. at 126.
223. Id. at 127.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 128.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 131 n.5.
235. Id. at 128.
236. Id.
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her assailant. 2 37 The trial court further held that force or coercion may
also consist of the imposition of psychological pressure upon a person
who is vulnerable and susceptible to such pressure.238 It also held that a
command issued by someone in a position of authority need not be
accompanied by an explicit threat in order for such a command to be
effectively and inherently coercive.239 The trial court held that the
defendant was able to overbear the will of the complainant either by the
authority that he represented, or by a modicum of physical force.2 40
While the trial court convicted DiPetrillo, expanding the abuse of
power model to the workplace setting; the Rhode Island Supreme Court
reversed, expressly rejecting this theory.24 1 The Rhode Island Supreme
Court held that it was unwilling to extend the abuse of power model to
the workplace context, namely, the similar construct that is adopted
when a police officer abuses his power to induce a suspect's unwanted
sexual submission, such as in State v. Burke, cannot apply for sexual
abuse of power in the workplace. 242
The contrasting views in Lanier and DiPetrilloprompt the questions:
What accounts for the different outcomes? Why is sexual abuse of
power in the workplace viewed as criminal conduct in one case but not
in the other? Furthermore, is this different legal treatment justified? At
first glance, the cases seem to share similar features; the sexual acts in
both cases did not occur in a custodial setting, but rather in a workplace
setting, and both cases involve a supervisor's and employer's sexual
abuse of power over competent victims who ostensibly had alternative
courses of action and the potential choices to refuse the sexual demands.
There is, however, a salient difference between these cases. In
Lanier, the perpetrator-a state judge-was authorized to exercise
professional power over his employees. Likewise, the official authority
element is a prominent feature in the military prohibition. In contrast, in
DiPetrillo, the perpetrator was the employer himself, an owner of his
private business. He was not authorized by any institution or
organization to exercise power over his employees. Another difference
is that in Lanier, the perpetrator used explicit threats to harm his
employees if they refused to give in to his sexual demands, while in
DiPetrillo, the perpetrator did not issue any threats. Moreover,
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 128-29.
240. Id. at 134.
241. Id. at 135 (citing State v. Burke, 522 A.2d 725, 728 (R.I. 1987)). In Burke, a police
officer coerced sex on a hitchhiker. The Rhode Island Supreme Court held in DiPetrillothat the
court was "not willing to extend the Burke analysis of implied threats to the facts in this case, in
which the implied threat arose solely in the context of an employment relationship."
242. Id.
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DiPetrillo did not offer any "rewards" in exchange for sexual
compliance. He did, however, exploit his position of power by using
coercive pressures, which placed his employee in fear of harm.
Revisiting DiPetrillo demonstrates that official authorization to
enforce obedience plays a crucial role that explains the contrasting
views with Lanier as well as with the military law. The trial court in
DiPetrillo was willing to concede that the exercise of power by the
employer extends above and beyond threats to harm. By explicitly
rejecting the threat-based construct as the sole basis for criminalizing
the employer's conduct, the trial judge was willing to expand the abuse
of power framework to the employment context, and in particular, to a
case in which the employer is the owner of a private company and is not
authorized by anybody to exercise power.243 The Rhode Island Supreme
Court, however, refused to extend the same reasoning adopted in cases
where official power to enforce obedience is exploited-such as when a
police officer abuses his power to obtain submission from suspects-to
competent adults whose legal status is not that of confinement. 44 Under
this court's holding, a police officer abusing his or her exercise of
official authority over suspects justifies criminalization while a private
employer abusing their power over employees does not. 45
C. Rejecting the Lack of Choices-DifficultChoices Distinction
The above position is premised on the common distinction between a
victim's lack of choices, on the one hand, and difficult choices, on the
other. This distinction typically stands at the core of refusal to expand
the scope of criminal regulation to competent adults, particularly in the
workplace and in the academic setting. 6 Under this account, coercive
pressures overwhelm a victim's free will only when placing her in a
position where she has no other choice but to submit to unwanted sexual
acts. In contrast, when a victim has alternative courses of action to
choose from, but the choice is difficult in light of the unpleasant and
undesirable outcome, her free will is not overwhelmed and her choice is

deemed a valid one. 24 7
243. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 261 (1997).
244. DiPetrillo, 922 A.2d at 126-27.
245. See id. at 134, 135 (citing and drawing comparisons to Burke).
246. See, e.g., SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 281 (suggesting that despite the undoubted
dangers of sexual relations between parties of unequal power, criminal sanctions are out of place
in most consensual sexual relationships between supervisors and subordinates or between
teachers and students).
247. See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 792 P.2d 1103, 1105-06 (Mont. 1990). See also
Commonwealth v. Mlinarich, 542 A.2d 1335, 1341 (Pa. 1988) (drawing on a choice-based
distinction, these courts viewed the victims as having made a difficult choice rather than
enduring the harmful alternatives).
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The proposal advanced in this Article rejects this distinction by
offering a comprehensive model that would enable criminalizing
various forms of abuses stemming from professional and institutional
settings, including those in which the victims are competent adults, such
as in the workplace and in an academic setting. The proposal's premise
is that the choice-based distinction is inherently flawed. First, the
question of choices must rest on a legal rather than empirical evaluation.
It thus encompasses what the law regards as legally valid choices.
Rather than inquiring whether any theoretical choices are available, the
key questions are whether these choices are practical under the
compelling circumstances the victim is facing, as well as whether the
law should uphold these as valid choices. Second, the choice-based
distinction fails to evaluate the victim's subjective experience. The
victim's vantage point better captures the question of which practical
choices were actually available to her when the perpetrator exercised
coercive pressures.
Not long ago, common social perceptions, as well as the legal
system, failed to grasp why a battered woman often stays with her
abuser. 248 Drawing on the question of choices, the premise was that a
competent adult has alternative courses of action. But in the context of
domestic violence, this narrow view has changed; contemporary law
acknowledges that a battered woman's choices are limited by economic
and psychological considerations. 249 A battered woman often believes
that she has no option but to stay with her abusive spouse. The reasons
for not leaving typically include fear of retaliation and of various types
of harm, such as financial hardship. 250 Thus, domestic violence law
today not only concedes that a battered woman's choices must be
evaluated based on her subjective perception and vantage point, but also
understands the need for a legal-rather than empirical-inquiry.2 5 '
A similar view regarding victims' choices may equally apply in the
context of abuse of power over victims who are competent adults and
who are not in custody. The question of whether an employee has an
alternative course of action must be evaluated based on her vantage
248.

See generally LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 18-31 (1979) (discussing

the myths concerning battering). For a judicial opinion that draws extensively on the work by
Walker, see, e.g., State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364 (N.J. 1984)).
249. See, e.g., Kathleen Waits, The Criminal Justice System's Response to Battering:
Understanding the Problem, Forging the Solutions, 60 WASH. L. REv. 267, 279-85 (1985)
(providing an account that explains why battered women stay with abusive spouses).
250. See generally ALYCE D. LAVIOLETTE & OLA W. BARNETT, IT COULD HAPPEN TO
ANYONE: WHY BATTERED WOMEN STAY 53-54 (Sage Publications, Inc. 2000) (articulating

factors contributing to a victim's decision to stay).
251. See Robin L. West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological
Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 Wis. WOMEN's L.J. 81, 83-87 (1987) (explaining why the
liberal focus on choices is misdirected).
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point. In light of economic, professional, and institutional constraints,
an employee often feels that no practical choices are available to her.
Her decision to submit under these compelling circumstances should not
be upheld by the law as a valid choice. Competent adults' sexual
choices may also be constrained to the point that prevents them from
exercising their free will. A "choice" to submit under professional and
institutional coercive pressures should not be viewed differently than a
"choice" to submit under the threat of a gun pointed to one's head.
The underlying result of drawing on the choice-based distinction as
demarcating the boundary between criminal coercion and permissible
seduction is that it diverts our attention from capturing the nature of
many sexual abuses of power. This distinction also results in paying
scant attention to many other harmful sexual abuses, above and beyond
the cases where free will is physically overwhelmed or legally
constrained. The distinction fails to capture the essential feature that
characterizes all forms of professional and institutional relations in
which sexual abuse of power, authority, trust, and dependence induce
the victim's submission. In such a situation, perpetrators exploit the
existing power disparities to coerce submission by subjugating the
victims' free will to the perpetrator's advantage. The choice-based
distinction fails to draw the line between coercive abuse of power and
legitimate conduct, and cannot justify a differential treatment for
different victims of sexual abuse of power. Thus, it must be rejected
altogether.

V. A PROPOSAL

FOR A SEXUAL ABUSE OF POWER MODEL

Which types of illegitimate pressures should the definition of sexual
coercion include, and how far may the definition of authority extend for
applying an abuse of power model? Criminal law generally does not
find coercion or invalidate consent in adult relationships strongly
influenced by power, authority, and trust.252 The key question is
whether an abuse of power model may expand to include additional
forms of coercive pressure and intimidation, such as those typically
present in professional and institutional settings, expanding a definition
of coercion beyond those circumstances that are currently recognized as
justifying criminalization.

252. See generally SCHULHOFER, supra note 5, at 168-253 (discussing coercive pressures
stemming from various professional and institutional relations and suggesting that criminal law
typically refuses to criminalize them. Instead, he argues that these abuses should generally be
regulated under civil laws).
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A. Expanding the Abuse ofPower Model to Additional Settings
The proposal's goal is to establish a clear boundary between
coercive and legitimate sexual conduct in professional and institutional
settings. It calls for developing some practical guidelines that would
criminalize the abuse of institutional authority or economic duress in
professional settings, but would not criminalize submission in private
settings that is influenced by emotional demands or social pressure.
Previous proposals to expand the definition of coercion have failed in
articulating this legal boundary. 253 This Article suggests that the reasons
for this failure rest mainly in neglecting to explain the significance of
the abuse element, and to emphasize that only pressures stemming from
professional and institutional relations, as opposed to private relations,
may be criminalized.
Considering such expansion calls for addressing a twofold question.
First, beyond explicit threats to harm, should these coercive pressures
incorporate additional means of intimidation and fear if the sexual
demands are refused, and when the victims are competent adults such as
employees and students? Second, should an abuse of power model
incorporate additional forms of influencing and controlling victims'
decisions beyond the formal capacity to exercise authority over them?
The abuse of power model offers a potentially broad doctrinal
framework that enables criminalizing various forms of coercive
pressures stemming from professional and institutional settings.
However, its full potential has not yet materialized, as current laws
typically refuse to expand this model to cover additional forms of
coercion, thus leavin many abuses of power outside the scope of
criminal regulation.
The proposed model is premised on the
253.
force).

Id. at 82-98 (criticizing reform proposals that focus on expanding the definition of

254.

See ROSEMARIE TONG, WOMEN, SEX AND THE LAW 111 (1984) (discussing a 1978

proposed Virginia State Senate Bill). This bill specifies that a person who uses a position of
authority to accomplish sexual penetration or contact is guilty of sexual assault (rape) in one
degree or another. The bill defines "position of authority" quite broadly as:
Any relationship in which the actor appears to the victim to have a status which
implies the right of the actor to expect or demand obedience, acquiescence or
submission on the part of the victim. Authority or appearance of authority may
be established by, but not limited to, evidence of the relative ages, maturity or
occupations of the victim and actor; the blood or household relationship of the
actor to the victim; or the actor's position of trust relative to the victim such as
that involved in the support, care, comfort, discipline, custody, education or
counseling of the victim.
Id. This application in the case of abuse of power by a physician is unambiguous, while
applying the same provision in the context of sexual relations between a professor and his
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assumption that conceptually there is no substantive difference between
the various forms of sexual abuse of power, authority, trust, and
dependence that occur under professional and institutional relations.
The model would allow criminalizing various forms of abuse of power
within different types of professional and institutional relations,
including those currently not recognized as amounting to criminal
conduct, such as in the workplace and in an academic setting.
The thrust of the proposal draws on broadening the abuse of power
model to include various situations in which perpetrators exploit their
power, authority, trust, and dependence to dominate and influence
victims' decisions by inducing their submission to unwanted sexual
demands and by subjugating their wills to those of the perpetrators. The
core feature that justifies criminalization is that whenever coercive
pressures stemming from professional and institutional relations result
in apparent permission and unwanted submission to sexual acts, consent
is not obtained.
B. The Elements of the Offense
The proposed prohibition defines sexual coercion to include
pressures and impositions that often characterize sexual relations in
professional and institutional settings. Its focal point lies in determining
what type of conduct meets the definition of sexual abuse of power.
This inquiry is based on articulating two core elements that define the
offense: the first is the position differentials between the parties, and the
second is the exploitation of these imbalances to induce sexual
submission.
1. Imbalances in Powers in Professional and Institutional Relationships
The core predicate for criminalization under the proposal rests on the
effects of power, authority, influence, dominance, and trust in
professional and institutional relations in which power disparities
between the parties are most noticeable. In these cases, the sexual
relations arise out of "power dependency" relations.25 5 These are
particularly common in sexual relations that take place in institutional
and professional settings. Thus, in these types of relations, the definition
of authority must expand to incorporate additional forms of influence
and dominance. Two main features characterize these relations: position
student constitutes an ambiguous circumstance. Id.
255. See generally Phyllis Coleman, Sex in Power Dependency Relationships: Taking
Unfair Advantage of the "Fair"Sex, 53 ALB. L. REV. 95 (1988). Coleman first coined the term
"power dependency" relationships. She further argues that power dependency relations suggest
that the sexual relations are exploitative. Id
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imbalances and disparities in power between the parties, and the
victims' dependence on the perpetrators, which leads to their unique
vulnerability.
This type of vulnerability, however, is situational and socially
constructed; it lies in the organizational and structural features that
characterize professional and institutional settings, and not in the
victims' personal characteristics and weaknesses. Rather than
weakening complainants by portraying them as helpless victims,
criminalization would strengthen complainants by granting them
powerful rights, including the right to sexual integrity and to remain
free from sexual coercion.
Furthermore, professional, institutional, and economic vulnerability
is gender-neutral. The model concedes that power may be equally
abused across gender lines. Victims of sexual abuse of power may also
be males who are situated in disadvantageous positions that make them
vulnerable to abuse. Indeed, as the Showalter v. Allison Reed Group,
Inc. case illustrates, male as well as female victims fall prey to sexual
abuse of economic and professional disparities.2 5 6 In this case, the
sexually abused victim was a male, whose manager took advantage of
his economic vulnerability to coerce sex from him.2 57 Moreover, power
may also be abused by a female perpetrator under circumstances in
which she holds power over a dependent victim, such as a prison guard
who abuses a male inmate.25 8 The Department of Justice's recent survey
on sexual abuse of power in juvenile confinement facilities supports this
claim, revealing that "approximately 95% of youth [victims] reporting
staff sexual misconduct said they had been victimized by female
staff."2 59 Thus, the proposal advanced here places the overall notion of
"power"-rather than gender inequality-at the center of the coercion
inquiry by contending that determining sexual abuse often depends on
who holds the powerful position in a certain situation. 260
Under the proposal, coercion may also consist of imposing economic
or professional pressure. The law must recognize that a command by
someone in a position of authority need not be accompanied by any
threats for it to be effectively and inherently coercive. This framework
acknowledges the justifications for criminalizing sexual abuse of power
256. 767 F. Supp. 1205 (D.R.I. 1991), af'd sub. nom. Phetosomphone v. Allison Reed
Group, Inc., 984 F.2d 4 (1st Cir. 1993).
257. See id at 1207 (providing an example of an abuse of power of a vulnerable male by
his superior. The victim here was economically dependent on the medical insurance the
employer provided for his sick son.).
258. See, e.g., SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION, supra note I (finding that 95% of the victims
reported that they were sexually abused by female prison guards).
259. Id.
260. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, WOMEN'S LIvES, MEN's LAWs 246-48 (2005)
(placing gender inequalities at the basis of the expansion of the definition of coercion).
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in professional and institutional settings, regardless of whether explicit
threats are established. It further acknowledges that a coercive
atmosphere and unbearable pressures can equally induce the submission
of victims who are dominated by powerful perpetrators, notwithstanding
the question of official authority to enforce obedience.
Expanding the sexual abuse of power model calls for answering a
preliminary question: What type of conduct meets the definition of
"exercising authority under disparate powers"? In other words, how far
may the definition of power extend beyond the official authority to
enforce obedience? The answer lies in expanding the definition of the
term "authority" to incorporate additional forms of power, trust,
dependence, and influence in relations that indicate stark disparities in
positions between the parties.
The term "authority" can be either narrowly or more broadly
construed. Considered narrowly, it is defined as the power or the right
to enforce obedience. 26 1 This is a restrictive interpretation that
encompasses only the legal right to command obedience on certain
types of victims. Under this account, authority necessarily denotes a
right to issue orders and to enforce their obedience. This definition
would only cover official authority, such as the one possessed by a
military commander, a police officer, or a prison guard, and not the
authority by an employer over his employee, or the authority exercised
by a professor over his student.
Two main limitations apply under this restrictive definition. One is
perpetrator-oriented, that is, to exercise official power over his victims,
the perpetrator must be authorized by a state, city, or another official
institution. When there is no legal authorization, such as when the
perpetrator is the owner of a private business, he cannot exercise
authority over his employees. The abuse of authority model therefore
would not apply in DiPetrillo, where the employer is the owner of a
company and is not legally authorized to exercise power over his
employee. 262 The second limitation is victim-oriented: a victim must be
legally placed under the official authority of the perpetrator. This
typically happens when a victim is legally confined and his personal
liberty significantly limited, such as in the case of suspects, inmates,
soldiers, or others in custodial settings.263 In contrast, employee and
student status is not that of confinement, and they are not officially
261. See, e.g., R. v. Matheson, 1999 Carswell Ont. 1080, 23 C.R. (5th) 269 1 103
(discussing the various interpretations of the term authority. In this case a psychologist was
accused of sexual assault of his patients after having a seemingly consensual sexual relations
with them, based on the theory that he abused his authority to obtain their submission).
262. See State v. DiPetrillo, 922 A.2d 124, 126 (R.I. 2007) (discussing that authority in the
narrow sense was lacking here since the defendant was the owner of his private business).
263. These settings might include, for example, hospitalized patients in mental institutions.
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placed under the perpetrator's control. Unlike the previous category,
employees and students ostensibly have the free choice to refuse
demands by simply leaving the abusive setting.
More broadly, however, "authority" may be defined to incorporate
the unofficial and informal power to influence the decisions and actions
of others who are dependent on the perpetrators.2 6 4 This nuanced
definition acknowledges that authority may be exercised in different
forms, and is not necessarily limited to the official commanding the
power, but rather extends beyond the legal capacity to enforce
obedience. Under this account, authority stems from the perpetrator's
role in relation to the victim. It is not limited to only the perpetrator's
exercise of a legal right over the victim, but also includes the power to
dominate and influence the victim's behavior. The key predicate for
applying this construct is that stark disparities in positions between the
parties result in the perpetrator's unique capacity to control and affect
the victim's behavior. These disparities in power are often present in
professional and institutional relations.
This proposed definition of authority within certain institutional and
professional settings does not conflict with the common understanding
of the term. Neither the term "power" nor "authority" is necessarily
limited to the legal right to enforce obedience. What is relevant is
whether the particular relations between the parties have vested the
perpetrator with the ability to control the lives of dependent victims in
such a manner as to be able to extract their ostensible permission to
unwanted sex.
The workplace provides an example of where the capacity to
influence and control employees' actions might be established. The first
feature that characterizes these cases includes stark power disparities
between the parties and an imbalance in the relative positions they hold.
In such a situation, the perpetrator is an employer or a supervisor who
can control and affect the employee's position at the workplace, by
making either beneficial or detrimental decisions that affect her
professional future. The employee is placed in a significantly weaker
and less advantageous position because her professional future depends
on the perpetrator. The imbalances in power include both disparities in
professional positions as well as economic disparities. The second
feature common in these cases is dependency. Under the above
circumstances, the employee is dependent on the perpetrator's actions
and decisions. The fact that the employee's professional future depends
264. See, e.g., People v. Reid, 233 Mich. App. 457, 468-73 (1999) (holding that the
defendant placed himself in a position over the complainant, as the defendant had told the
complainant's father that he had been a counselor at a church, and that there was evidence that
he used this position of authority to coerce the complainant to submit to the sexual acts).
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on the perpetrator places her in a particularly vulnerable position, which
is inherently prone to exploitation.
The proposal would expand the criminal prohibition to include
competent adults when the circumstances indicate that their
dependence, trust, and professional and economic vulnerability resulted
in subjugating their free will to that of the powerful perpetrator, and
ultimately lead them to submit to unwanted sexual demands. Expanding
the definition of "authority" beyond its official and formal aspects
enables criminalizing a variety of coercive pressures stemming from
professional and institutional relations, in particular in the workplace
and in academic settings.
Adopting this definition of authority demonstrates that criminalizing
sexual abuse of power is equally justified both in public as well as
private workplaces. It does not draw on the question of formal
authorization, but rather on the type of influence the perpetrator
exercises over the victim. Even when a private employer is not
authorized to exercise power over his employee, he is often able to
control her actions. This ability to affect the victim's choices stems
from the power dependency relations between the parties, and it is not
necessarily limited to cases where the perpetrator holds official
authority. This feature demonstrates why the Lanier and the DiPetrillo
cases justify criminalization equally: in both cases, sexual abuse of
power, authority, trust, and dependence results in submission to the
perpetrators' unwanted sexual demands after the perpetrators were
effectively able to subjugate the victims' will to their own personal
desires.
2. The Exploitation and Abuse Element
The proposal to expand the sexual abuse of power model is based on
adopting two steps to determine whether the elements of the criminal
prohibition are met: establishing imbalances in power between the
parties, and a separate proof of exploitation. The significance of this
double-pronged inquiry rests on the mere presence of disparate
positions between the parties being insufficient on its own merit to
justify criminalization. Other rape law reforms have failed to articulate
the exploitation element, viewing the mere potential for exploitation in
sexual relationships as enough to justify criminalization.2 6 6 These
265. The term "subjugate" is discussed in the Michigan case, People v. Buyssee, No. 04011598-01, 2008 WL 2596341, at *6 (Mich. Ct. App. July 1, 2008). "Subjugate is defined: 1. to
bring under complete control or subjection; conquer; master. 2. to make submissive or
subservient; enslave. Id. (quoting RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DICTIONARY (1995)).

266. See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 260 (arguing that inequalities in power result in
abuse of this power without separately articulating the abuse element).
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proposals fail to provide a clear boundary between illegitimate sexual
conduct and legitimate sexual relationships. For example, Pennsylvania
law fails to elaborate on the core significance of the abuse element
while expanding the definition of coercion.26 7 Including psychological,
moral, and intellectual coercion, and acknowledging the role of position
differentials are important steps, but they are insufficient. A nuanced
and more practical abuse of power model must articulate the
perpetrator's ability to influence the victim's actions by demonstrating
the exploitation element.
In contrast, the model presented in this Article suggests that sexual
relationships between people of disparate power should not be viewed
as exploitative per se, as there is no preliminary presumption regarding
the exploitative nature of the sexual relations based merely on the
imbalances in positions between the parties. Instead, the abuse of power
inquiry separately examines two steps. First, whenever we suspect that
exploitation of power disparities induced submission to unwanted
sexual activity, we should ask whether the complainant was in a
position to make a free choice. Under circumstances where there is a
marked imbalance in the respective powers of the parties, a strong
suspicion arises that the victim's vulnerable position might have
diminished her ability to make a meaningful choice. But this step is
merely the point of departure in meeting the elements of the prohibition,
because vulnerability and dependence are, in themselves, insufficient
for determining exploitation. 268 The second step requires that we
separately establish that the complainant's reluctance to engage in
sexual activity was overwhelmed by the perpetrator's exploitation of the
above circumstances. The combined effect of both the disparities in
power and the exploitative nature of the relationship precludes the
possibility of consent under these circumstances.
C. Circumstancesthat Tend to Indicate Exploitation
In many sexual relations that occur in professional and institutional
settings, suspicion of exploitation often arises based on an intuitive "we
267. See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3121(a) (expanding the definition of coercion to
include psychological, moral, and intellectual coercion without articulating the exploitation
element). See also Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 510 A.2d 1217, 1220 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986)
(defendant engaged in sexual acts with an eight-year-old girl); Commonwealth v. Smolko, 666
A.2d 672, 674 n.3 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (trying a case where the victim who was handicapped
and unable to talk was sexually abused by his caregiver, a male nurse).
268. See, e.g., People v. Knapp, 244 Mich. App. 361, 369, 624 N.W.2d 227 (2001) (the
defendant, a Reiki instructor, was convicted of sexual contact with one of his students, after the
prosecution established that not only he was in a position of authority over the victim but also
that he abused and exploited this authority and the victim's vulnerability to coerce the victim to
submit).

140

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 21

know it when we see it" approach. 2 69 However, identifying several
conditions that point to exploitation can serve as a supporting tool.
Targeting these factors is significant to the coercion inquiry because
they are common features that are typically present in many situations
involving sexual abuse of power.
1. The Type of Relations
Sexual relations that occur in professional and institutional settings
are typically characterized by gross disparities in power between the
parties, therefore providing a prominent factor in the abuse inquiry.
Striking differences between the perpetrator's and complainant's
positions-professionally, institutionally, or economically-create the
potential for exploitation of this power. Often, the greater the disparities
in power, the higher the incidence of abuse.
Economic differentials are especially salient in the workplace. They
represent the other side of the power coin, since the superiors' relative
strength and power directly stem from their economic superiority.
Consequently, the complainant's disadvantageous position creates an
inherent economic vulnerability.
However, the type of relations only raises a strong suspicion that the
abuse element might be established. Actual exploitation might be
proven only once additional factors add up to these power imbalances.
Therefore, proving actual abuse in a particular case rests on the
combined effect of the type of relations with the additional factors
articulated below.
2. Divergence from Expected and Acceptable Norms
Proof of a departure from community norms is a common feature
typically established in many sexual abuses of power. A strong
indication for exploitation is established whenever the perpetrator's
conduct deviates from the professional or institutional role he is
expected to perform. 270 Sexual relations occurring under professional
and institutional settings often illustrate such behavior. Establishing the
perpetrator's departure from adequate norms of professional and
institutional conduct calls for comparing and contrasting the expected
269. This approach is often employed in the context of pornography. It was first used
when referring to obscenity by Justice Potter Stewart in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197
(1964).
270. See, e.g., People v. Regts, 219 Mich. App. 294, 296, 555 N.W.2d 896 (holding that
defendant's actions, as victim's psychotherapist, in manipulating therapy sessions to establish
relationships that would permit his sexual advances to be accepted without protest constituted
coercision, thus subjugating the victim into submitting to his sexual advances against her free
will).
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and acceptable norms with the conduct that is demonstrated in a
particular case, when we suspect that the perpetrator exploited his
position to induce the complainant's submission.
An example of divergence from expected community standards is
demonstrated in the context of the workplace. When a superior engages
in conduct of a sexual nature, he fulfills his own private urges at the
expense of the institution he is paid to represent. Such a departure from
acceptable norms in the workplace is more apparent when the
perpetrator is authorized by some institution and organization to
exercise professional power over employees. Here, exploitation is often
twofold; in addition to exploiting the vulnerability of the individual
employee, engaging in sexual conduct at work might also result in loss
of the public's trust in the institution itself. Recall that the decision in
Lawrence explicitly excluded from the scope of the constitutional
protection cases that involve both an injury to a person and abuse of an
institution.271 A plausible reading of this exclusion suggests that such
exploitation of professional power might also amount to abuse of an
institution by damaging its reputation and integrity. 2 72
However, a similar divergence is equally established when the
perpetrator is a private employer, such as the owner of a company. An
employer who exploits his professional role to obtain sex from an
employee deviates from acceptable standards of conduct in the
workplace. The divergence is often illustrated when an employer
engages an employee in extra-curricular activities during or after
working hours as a pretext for sex. Typical examples include drinking
alcoholic beverages while at work and using work-related excuses to
lure the employee to the employer's home. Conduct that indicates
persistent attempts to move from the workplace to a private setting
further supports the abuse element.27 3 The academic context provides
another example for such a divergence. Engaging in sex with students
exceeds the scope of a professor's mandate: it neither fosters the
educational paradigm nor serves an educational goal.
The divergence from acceptable norms is closely linked to the
defendant's mens rea; to find a defendant guilty of a sexual assault, the
prosecution must establish his knowledge of the complainant's lack of
271. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
272. I am aware that my reading of Lawrence's "abuse of an institution" language is not
the common understanding of this term. The common reading suggests that the court alludes to
the abuse of marriage as an institution. However, when considering the abuse element that
characterizes many abuses of power in professional and institutional relations, this additional
aspect of abuse is also a plausible reading that might support an abuse of power model.
273. See, e.g., State v. DiPetrillo, 922 A.2d 124, 127-28 (R.I. 2007) (illustrating such a
departure from professional conduct: in the pretext of the need to stay late to assist him in a
project, the perpetrator took the employee to run some errands, stopped by his house to change
clothes, and gave her four cans of beer).
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consent (or alternatively, being reckless or willfully blind to it). 27 4
Under the proposed prohibition, the jury would have to decide whether
the defendant's conduct illustrates a gross deviation from acceptable
conduct, which inducing a complainant's submission through sexual
abuse of power clearly demonstrates. Outside the context of abuse of
power in professional and institutional relations, a defense of mistake of
fact often removes culpability for those who honestly, but mistakenly,
believed that the complainant consented, provided that they took
reasonable steps to ascertain her willingness.275 Such a defense,
however, would not be available to a defendant who abused his power
to induce unwanted submission. 276 The underlying premise justifying
the proposed model is that a complainant is unable to effectively
communicate her unwillingness when coercive pressures are exerted on
her. Raising a defense of mistake as to the complainant's consent in
light of the circumstances that indicate sexual abuse of power is thus
implausible. It would circumvent the prohibition's reasoning and defeat
its purpose. The divergence factor thus plays a crucial role in the sexual
abuse of power inquiry because it establishes the defendant's mens rea.
The departure from acceptable norms of conduct is sometimes not
enough to prove exploitation. However, the exploitation element is
established when such departure is added to other factors that indicate
the perpetrator's abusive behavior. 2 77 The combined effect of these
features further establishes a coercive environment. These include the
complainants' account, narrative, and experiences regarding the nature
of the sexual relations, such as the complainants' fear and intimidation.
274. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 210 Conn. 132, 141, 554 A.2d 713 (1989) (holding that the
state must prove either an actual awareness on the part of the defendant that the complainant had
not consented or a reckless disregard of her non-consenting status).
275. See, e.g., State v. Koperski, 578 N.W.2d 837, 846, 848 (Neb. 1998) (concluding that
the accused belief of consent was objectively reasonable, and that his requested instruction on
the defense of mistake should have been given).
276. Cf UCMJ Amendment, supra note 209, subsection (15) defines mistake of fact as to
consent to mean that
the accused held, as a result of ignorance or mistake, an incorrect belief that the
other person engaging in the sexual conduct consented. The ignorance or
mistake must have existed in the mind of the accused and must have been
reasonable under all the circumstances. To be reasonable the ignorance or
mistake must have been based on information, or lack of it, which would
indicate to a reasonable person that the other person consented. Additionally,
the ignorance or mistake cannot be based on the negligent failure to discover
the true facts. Negligence is the absence of due care. Due care is what a
reasonably careful person would do under the same or similar circumstances.
277. See Buchhandler-Raphael, supranote 42, manuscript at 51-55 (discussing conditions
that indicate the abuse element).
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Two common features that often characterize victims' response to
sexual assaults are repetitive and persistent demands and "frozen
fright," a psychological response that renders the victim almost
physically paralyzed and therefore unable to resist and protest the
assault.2 7 Finally, several other complainants who claim that the same
perpetrator coerced them into unwanted sexual acts might also serve as
a powerful indication to establish the abuse element.
D. Policy Considerationsand ProsecutorialDiscretion
In past decades, evolving social norms about sexuality and gender
have led to significant reform in rape law. This Article argues that the
interaction of legal reforms and societal norms can work the other way
as well, with criminal law helping to bring about changes in social
norms. The law functions by both articulating which sexual practices
amount to criminal conduct and defining what qualifies as consent. The
model advanced here offers an opportunity to use criminal law to
accomplish a profound change in societal perceptions about the
boundaries between legitimate and illegitimate sexual practices.
The proposal must take into account at least one limitation: criminal
law can be an effective tool in changing norms, but legislation alone
does not suffice. The law cannot solve all the problems that result in
sexual abuses of power. However, it is crucial that the law recognizes
and responds to these problems. While criminal prosecution may
provide only a limited solution, the more important task is to prevent the
harm before it occurs. Prevention may be done mainly through nonlegal techniques, such as education and raising public awareness about
the importance of meaningful consent to sex. Raising public awareness
includes the need to be proactive in promoting the idea of sexual
relations as one of mutual agreement and willingness. Moreover,
education requires that the community confront the problem and not
ignore it. The second aspect of education involves training law
enforcement on how to respond to sexual abuses of power and making
clear that this conduct not only involves unwanted sexual acts, but also
nonconsensual sexual acts that amount to criminal offenses.
The significance of using these non-legal techniques in addition to
changing legal provisions lies in the fact that, under our criminal justice
system, criminal cases are decided by a jury. Juries make decisions
about culpability based on the social norms they hold regarding the
boundaries between legitimate and illegitimate sexual practices, and on
how they define consent to sex.279 The decision in Baby reveals that the
278. See, e.g., People v. Iniguez, 872 P. 2d 1183, 1185 (Cal. 1994) (considering
psychological testimony that the victim was paralyzed by fright).
279. See generally Kahan, supra note 138.
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jury's perceptions resulted in mistakenly viewing apparent permission
as valid consent.280 It demonstrates that legal change is not
accomplished until societal perceptions are changed accordingly.
Considering the ever-evolving societal norms reveals the crucial role
that prosecutorial discretion plays in shaping these norms and in
bringing about social changes. Prosecutors do so by deciding which
cases to bring criminal charges on. Therefore, the problem of sexual
abuse of power goes much deeper than the need to amend rape law
provisions. The problem involves not only changing the law itself, but
also requires a similar change in prosecutorial discretion about which
cases to prosecute. Prosecutors are the ones who decide which sexual
misconducts deserve to be outlawed, rendering the remaining cases
legitimate sexual practices.281
Broadly worded rape laws in some jurisdictions theoretically enable
prosecuting various forms of sexual abuse of power in professional and
institutional settings.282 However, it is the prosecutorial discretion that
significantly limits the potential use of these provisions. By refraining from
pursuing criminal charges in those subtle instances of sexual abuse of
power, such as those occurring in the workplace and in academic settings,
prosecutors narrow the scope of these seemingly expansive provisions.
This Article shows that prosecutors typically pursue criminal charges
only in egregious and transparent sexual abuses of power. They choose
to forgo criminal charges where subtle, more ambiguous abuses of
power occur, because the criminal justice system places such cases at
the margins. We must critically examine the policy considerations that
underline this prosecutorial discretion and evaluate whether these
choices should be upheld. In contrast with the typical reluctance to
pursue the more controversial sexual abuses, cases such as Baby and
DiPetrillo demonstrate rare examples of brave and innovative
prosecutorial discretion.2 83 In these cases, prosecutors chose to pursue
280. See Baby v. State, 946 A.2d 463,471-72 (Md. 2008).
281. See Donald Dripps, After Rape Law: Will the Turn to Consent Normalize the
Prosecution of Sexual Asssault?, 41 AKRON L. REV. 957, 959 (2008) (positing that jury trial is
an exotic department from plea bargaining and in plea bargaining prosecutors have plenary
discretion to select charges to the extent that in effect, criminal liability is determined by
prosecutors).
282. See, e.g., the expansion of the definition of sexual coercion in Pennsylvania and in
New Jersey. Pennsylvania defines "forcible compulsion" to incorporate: "Compulsion by use of
physical, intellectual, moral, emotional, or psychological force, either express or implied . . ."
See 18 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 3101 (2003); New Jersey defines sexual coercion to also
include threats that cause substantial harm to someone's reputation, financial condition or
career. N.J. STAT. §§ 2c:13-5(a)(7) (2005). However, criminal charges in these jurisdictions are
not brought regarding coerced sexual acts in the workplace and in an academic setting.
283. See generally State v. Baby, 946 A.2d 463, 465 (Md. 2008); State v. DiPetrillo, 922
A.2d 124, 126 (R.I. 2007).
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criminal charges in circumstances that are typically not viewed as
justifying criminalization. Indeed, social changes can be achieved only
through innovative thinking. But societal perceptions evolve gradually
and, in both cases, the prosecution's underlying theory was rejected.
However, this type of prosecutorial discretion offers a significant
contribution to raising public awareness to the problems targeted here,
and in time, may also result in legal changes.
VI. CONCLUSION

In today's post-Lawrence era, the right to sexual autonomy in
relationships that take place between consenting adults in private
settings prevails over criminal regulation, and justifiably so. When
consensual sexual relationships are involved, favoring the positive side
of sexual autonomy-the right to engage in sexual relations with
whomever one chooses-is both warranted and necessary. A primary
goal of this Article has been to focus on the negative side. It argues that
when nonconsensual sexual relations are demonstrated, the positive
aspect of sexual autonomy must yield to two additional, yet not fully
recognized, fundamental rights: The right to remain free from sexual
coercion, and the right to enjoy sexual integrity. The crux of this Article
is that sexual abuses of power in professional and institutional settings
provide an example of such nonconsensual sex. When genuine consent
is lacking, a balancing-act between one individual's right to engage in
sex and another's right to avoid it requires that the right to avoid sex
prevails over the competing autonomy value.
This Article has taken a robust step in this direction by arguing that
sexual abuses of power, stemming from professional and institutional
relationships, demonstrate a harmful and wrongful conduct that justifies
criminalization. The analysis offered here has illustrated that these
different misconducts share some distinctive features: submission to
unwanted sexual demands is obtained through sexual abuse of power,
authority, trust, and dependence. Moreover, consent to sexual relations
is lacking when apparent permission is induced by fears and coercive
pressures. The Article has proposed a model that acknowledges these
features and thus equally justifies criminalizing various forms of sexual
abuse of power. This model is able to cover the subtle cases that
typically lie outside the central core of criminal sexual misconduct, but
are nonetheless equally harmful.
In the hope that criminalizing various forms of abuse of power will
help reduce abusive sexual practices in professional and institutional
settings. A goal of doing so is to help create a world in which all
individuals, both male and female, are afforded powerful rights of
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protection from unwanted sex. The time is ripe for promoting such a
social change through this Article's proposed legal reform.

